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In the 1990s the United States Armed Forces will be asked by its
leaders to do more with less. This represents a significant turn
from the policies of the last decade. During World War Two the
German Army operated effectively under similar policy constraints.
There are many lessons in strategic planning that can be learned
from Field Marshal Erich von Manstein's operations during the
Winter of 1942-43. He was able to grasp tremendous opportunity
amid extreme strategic danger. He decisively changed the strategic
situation on the Eastern Front over a four month period. This
thesis addresses the following questions. What factors enabled him
to operate so effectively? What hindered him? What decisions did
he make, when and why? How might leaders today make similar
decisions under similar circumstances and be as successful? The
answers to these questions will be of great value to the United
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A NOTE ON FIGURES
The figures for this paper are not individually
footnoted. Each one contains information from several maps.
The front lines are frequently derived not from a map, but
from an analysis of the text, specifically which towns were
held by whom, and when. Providing the most assistance in this
regard are; David Glantz's "From the Don to the Dnepr,"
General fel dmarschall Erich von Manstein's Lost Victories , Alan
Clark's Barbarossa , Earl Ziemke's Stalingrad to Berlin , and
Brigadier Young's Atlas of the Second World War . Based on




Centuries ago, Thucydides, an ancient Greek historian,
wrote his history of the Peloponnesian Wars to enlighten
"those who want to understand clearly the events which
happened in the past and which (human nature being what it is)
will some time or other and in much the same ways be repeated
in the future." His words have proven their value in the
years since. Historical analysis remains one of the most
valuable tools for predicting the future. Every current
situation has equivalents in the past. By studying the
scenarios of the past and their outcomes one gains valuable
insights into how to deal with the contemporary world.
The essence of war has changed little over the centuries.
It is an activity dependent upon human interaction. Though
weapons have changed, the motivations involved with war remain
consistent and distinctly human. In every war certain
individuals will emerge as leaders. These leaders can have a
profound effect on the outcome of the war. Some exhibit such
prowess that they are called geniuses. This was true in
Thucydides' time and remains true today. This paper studies
one such military genius as he operated during an
1 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian Wars, trans.
Rex Warner (London: Penguin Books, 1954), 24; quoted in
Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking In Time
(London: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1986), 232.
extraordinarily hazardous situation — General fel dmarschall
Erich von Manstein, commander of Army Group Don and later Army
Group South, during the Soviet Winter Offensive of 1942-43.
Liddell Hart wrote that "the German generals of this war
[World War II] were the best-finished product of their
profession — anywhere." Manstein was one of the best in
that elite group. His campaign against the Soviets "that
winter" demonstrated a brilliant mastery of mobile warfare.
This paper first develops a wcxing definition of the term
"military genius" and of the "ci-nate of war" in which he must
operate. The writings of Carl von Clausewitz provide the
framework for this discussion.
Clausewitz is recognized universally as the most important
thinker on the essence of war. His ideas have stood the test
of time successfully. The paper next will discuss principles
of war. They will be distilled down to three for the purposes
of this study; Initiative, Surprise and Concentration of
Effort. The body of the text contains four chapters detailing
Manstein' s campaign during the Winter of 1942-43. The first
will address the battle to save Sixth Army at Stalingrad. The
second is concerned with the battle to save the entire German
southern wing in the East. The third chapter will show the
increasing danger as Soviet objectives expanded. Uniquely,
Manstein sensed opportunity even as the danger increased.
2 Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories , ed. Anthony G.
Powell (London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1958), 17.
Chapter four shows finally the genius at work as Manstein
delivered his devastating counterattack against the Soviets.
Each chapter will contain an analysis of the specific "climate
of war" affecting operations at that point of the campaign.
The study will next analyze the most important points of
Manstein' s conduct during that winter and how he used the
principles of war to his advantage. A final section will link
past to present. By studying a military genius in this way,
I have been able to understand the qualities which made him so
effective and feel that others may be enlightened by such a
study. Training and education will be top priorities in the
1990s as the United States Armed Forces attempt to reduce its
numbers yet maintain their capabilities. The professionalism
which stems from effective training and education is a primary
force multiplier. Wars and the human qualities needed to win
them do not change over time. Manstein embodied many of those
qualities during his campaign on the East Front in the Winter
of 1942-43. Military professionals, most of whom fall
somewhere below the caliber of genius, can learn from his
example.
II. TAXONOMY
A. TOE MILITARY GENIUS
In the early 1800s, Carl von Clausewitz defined "genius"
in his work, On War, and dictionaries define it today in much
the same way. Clausewitz believed a genius possesses an
extraordinarily well developed mental aptitude for a
particular occupation. A military genius is able to call upon
several natural gifts of mind and temperament when engaged in
military activity. These gifts must exist in a harmonious
combination. One or another ability may predominate but not
conflict with the others. A single quality (i.e., great
courage) will not make a military genius if other qualities
are lacking. It is uncertain what portion of these qualities
may be learned but for the most part they remain the products
of nature. Rarely does nature produce the genius Clausewitz
describes . 3
He sees the primary element of this harmonious combination
as a high level of intelligence. Great intelligence enhances
all other gifts which embody the military genius. All
societies can produce great leaders but only the most advanced
civilizations can produce the military genius and effectively
Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael
Howard and Peter Paret (New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 1976), 100.
record his exploits. Leaders like Alexander the Great,
Hannibal, and Napoleon only appeared after their respective
societies had reached a high level of civilization.
Clausewitz is telling us to first search the most advanced
societies for his military genius. Certainly the Germany of
World War Two was highly advanced intellectually though its
political leadership was morally primitive. 4
Clausewitz logically discerned that a military genius is
first a soldier. As a soldier, he must have courage.
Courage, as Clausewitz observed an the battlefields of the
Napoleonic Wars, is of two types. The first is courage to
face personal danger. This can stem from an indifference to
danger. Such indifference is a permanent condition resulting
from an individual's constitution, or his holding life cheap,
or simply habit. Personal courage may spring from emotions.
Ambition, patriotism, or enthusiasm of any kind can create
personal courage. Emotional courage is not a permanent state.
Ideally the soldier wants both forms of personal courage in
combination. The first is more reliable and leaves the mind
calm. The second is bolder and will often achieve more but it
also can blind. Clausewitz shrouds personal courage in the
element of chance. Only the most experienced veteran knows if
he has the first type. The majority of those on the
battlefield can only hope nature has endowed them with it.
4 Ibid., 101.
For some that hope is realized. With type two, Clausewitz
gives hope and a warning. Even without type one, every
soldier can use emotional fervor, under the right
circumstances, to achieve courageousness on the battlefield.
A commander must be wary of his enemy, and how that same
fervor can make a seemingly weak opponent into an effective
fighter. The cases where individuals display great personal
courage are frequently the products of chance. This is less
so in a military genius. 5
The second type of courage is that needed to accept
responsibility. This can be from among comrades or from
within oneself. Intelligence plays an important role
regarding this type of courage. A soldier must learn when to
accept responsibility and when to delegate, and to what
degree. Intellect coupled with the individual's morality will
decide how much of this type of courage a soldier will
possess. Certainly a commander will need more of this courage
than those in subordinate positions.
War demands extraordinary physical exertion from those
involved. A soldier must possess a certain strength of body
and of soul to be victorious. This may come from birth or
extensive training and if a soldier has no other qualities, a
strong body and soul will prepare him well for the
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
battlefield. While Clausewitz emphasizes the intellectual
aspect of a military genius he realizes the importance of
strength on the battlefield. '
Chance and uncertainty are constant companions of anyone
engaged in war. To overcome these elements a soldier must
have two qualities. The first is described by a French term,
coup d'oeil, the 'f lash-of-insight ' . Clausewitz describes
this quality as "an intellect that, even in the darkest hour,
retains some glimmerings of the inner light which leads to
truth." A soldier makes sound decisions in the heat of
battle. The second quality is determination. Clausewitz
describes this as "the courage to follow this faint light
wherever it may lead." 9 This courage is aroused by the
intellect which then supports and sustains it in action. That
same intellect creates doubt and hesitation in the face of
several possibilities. Determination limits the agonies of
doubt and the perils of hesitation when there is little
motivation for action. Clausewitz seems to be saying the
military genius should be able to discern the truth and be
ready to do what is necessary to reach that truth, under the





In war a soldier also must have presence of mind. This is
an increased capacity for dealing with the unexpected. A
correct decision taken after long reflection is commonplace,
while that same decision made as an immediate response is
extraordinary. Presence of mind requires steady nerves if one
is to exhibit resourcefulness in the face of sudden danger.
It seems this quality can be improved by training to the
extent that the unexpected becomes less so. But for the most
part Clausewitz believes presence of mind to be a gift of
nature
.
A soldier must have great strength of will if he is to
make progress against the "climate of war." A commander must
subdue the anxiety which stems from his responsibility for the
losses in battle. If the fighting is prolonged, the moral and
physical strength of the soldiers is slowly drained. There is
a tendency for a commander to become paralyzed by the real or
imagined consequences of his actions. A commander must retain
his strength, first in himself and then in those under his
command who have entrusted him with their lives. In the
severest case the inertia of the entire unit can come to rest
on the commander's will alone. His spirit must rekindle the
flame of purpose in his men, or he will lose control of them
and be defeated. Clausewitz believes a commander must have
11 Ibid., 103.
self-control. He must remain in control of his emotions using
them as he would any other tools to achieve victory. ^2
A soldier is well served by a special gift Clausewitz
calls a sense of locality. This can only be achieved by an
imagination which enables a soldier to grasp quickly and
accurately the topography of an area. A commander should, in
his mind, be able to see every important road-network, river-
line, mountain range or anything else affecting his
operations. If he can do that, his war-fighting efficiency
will increase dramatically. JmJ
Clausewitz discerns ambition as perhaps the most powerful
of inspirations for men in battle. It instills a spirit of
endeavor in commanders at all levels. They exhibit a certain
inventiveness, energy, and competitive enthusiasm in their
efforts to distinguish themselves. Ambition in the ranks can
vitalize an army, making it victorious. History has rarely
known a great general who was not ambitious. 14
A military genius must possess all these qualities in some
degree. He must have; a high level of intelligence, courage,
strength of body and soul, coup d f oeil, determination,
presence of mind, strength of will, sense of locality, and




element may predominate but can not conflict with the others.
Clausewitz describes the sort of mind likeliest to display the
qualities of military genius in the following:
It is the inquiring rather than the creative mind, the
comprehensive rather than the specialized approach, the
calm rather than the excitable head to which in war we
would choose to entrust the fate of our . . . country. "
By Clausewitz's definition Manstein was a military genius. It
is difficult to determine what portion of the qualities which
make a military genius is God-given and what is man-made.
Clearly, training can play an important role in developing
each quality but rarely will that individual be able to use
them all in harmonious combination. Manstein used each of
these qualities to achieve success during the Winter of 1942-
43 on the East Front, one of the severest "climates of war"
ever encountered
.
B. THE "CLIMATE OF WAR"
Clausewitz said war is neither art, nor science, but a
combination of both. While certain campaigns and battles take
on the appearance of art when studied closely, their outcome
is affected frequently by the science of weaponry or the
correlation of forces. Similarly, the most scientific and
comprehensive plans, based on the most capable weapons/ and
employed with the most advantageous correlation of forces,
will sometimes meet unforeseen defeat on the battlefield. The
15 Ibid., 112.
10
"climate of war", in which every conflict takes place, makes
war different from any other field of study. According to
Clausewitz, that climate consists of four elements: danger,
exertion, uncertainty and chance. These accent the distinctly
human aspect of war.
Danger saturates every battlefield. For the infantryman
it is immediate and threatens his life. For a commander the
danger to his life is perhaps diminished relative to duty on
the front line, but he feels the additional weight of danger
to the units under he commands. Within the realm of danger on
the battlefield, Clausewitz said the following:
Here ideas are governed by other factors, that the light
of reason is refracted in a manner quite different from
that which is normal in academic speculation. It is the
exceptional man who keeps his powers of quick decision
intact if he has never been through this experience
before. 17
Danger makes soldiers behave differently, sometimes in ways
they thought impossible. Great courage, powerful ambition, or
long familiarity with danger can reduce the debilitating
effects of danger on the battlefield. S. L. A. Marshall
discusses the importance of comrades in battle. A feeling of




1 8danger. However no soldier is unaffected by this element
in war.
Exertion affects war in many immeasurable ways. Fatigue
and deprivation suffered by the participants in a campaign
will affect their performance on the battlefield. Exertion is
the coefficient of all forces. Its exact limit cannot be
determined. Clausewitz said, "just as it takes a powerful
archer to bend the bow beyond the average, so it takes a
powerful mind to drive his army to the limit." That limit
might bring unexpected victory while one step beyond it might
bring collapse and defeat. Exertion makes defeat more
devastating and victory more admirable. Whenever humans
compete exertion will make itself felt and war is the ultimate
competition. "
Uncertainty is the constant companion of every soldier.
If a commander lowers his guard uncertainty can squander his
unit's energy like a mouse on a treadmill. In war, more
information usually makes a commander less certain. Of the
reports constantly reaching him, many are contradictory, more
are false and most are uncertain. For a commander Clausewitz
gives the following advice:
18 Samuel L. A. Marshall, Men Against Fire (New York:
William Morrow & Company, 1947) 42.




The dangers reported may soon, like waves subside; but
like waves they keep recurring, without apparent reason.
The commander must trust his judgement and stand like a
rock on which the waves break in vain. 22
No one can ever completely gauge the potential of his enemy or
himself. As long as humans change their minds uncertainty
will make itself felt in war. "
Chance is the best-known of the elements making up the
"climate of war." In a campaign the weather can be a deciding
factor and is always a matter of chance. When countless
variables interact on the battlefield things happen which can
only be described as matters of chance. At times these chance
events can decide wars but most of the time they disrupt
operations and are a constant irritant to commanders an both
sides. Clausewitz describes the element of chance in war in
the following:
Every war is rich in unique episodes. Each is an
uncharted sea, full of reefs. The commander may suspect
the reefs' existence without ever having seen them; now he
has to steer past them in the dark. If a contrary wind
springs up, if some major mischance appears, he will need
the greatest skill and personal exertion, and the utmost
presence of mind, though from a distance everything may
seem to be proceeding automatically. 24
A commander must realize he will encounter the element of





happens, adapt to it as best he can, and proceed forward. If
he fails in this, chance will defeat him. "
The "climate of war" affects every war, past, present, or
future. It is impossible to measure. It creates what
Clausewitz calls "friction". This friction is what
distinguishes real war from war on paper. It makes the
apparently simple task extraordinarily difficult. Manstein
recognized the "climate of war" he was in. He planned for it
when possible and adjusted to it when necessary to achieve his
successes during "that winter." Another important element of
his success was an instinctive grasp of the basic principles
of war.
C. THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR
Napoleon said:
the Principles of War are those which have regulated the
great captains. . .: Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar,.
The history of [their] campaigns, . . . would be a
complete treatise on the art of war; the principles which
ought to be followed in offensive and defensive war, would
flow from it spontaneously. ^6
However, as Ulysses S. Grant observed, "if men make war in
slavish obedience to rules, they will fail." 2 ' A strategist
should have an understanding of the Principles of War. They
25 Ibid., 119.
26 Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., ed., Military Strategy: Theory




can be a sort of checklist to assist sound judgement, provided
they are sensibly administered. As no two situations are ever
quite alike, a strategist must recognize this and apply the
principles accordingly. To a genius this process is second
nature that the rest of us must practice. Manstein was such
TO
a genius. *°
The United States Army currently recognizes ten principles
of war. The accepted list changes over time and with respect
to each nation. The three most widely recognized are;
Initiative, Surprise, and Concentration of Effort. All the
other principles can be grouped, in more or less supporting
roles, under these three. ^
Initiative enables the wielder to engage the enemy at
times and places of his choosing using the tactics he desires.
By seizing the initiative one side forces the other to react
rather than act. To be victorious, an Army must at some
point, take the initiative. This is true even if it only
involves following the enemy as he retreats, having expended
himself upon your defensive positions. Principles such as
Purpose, Maneuver and Exploitation are closely associated with





Lang recognized as valuable in war, Surprise is a force
multiplier without equal. It is more easily achieved at the
tactical level but its affects are often greater if achieved
at the strategic level . Surprise does not have to be
complete. If the enemy fails to grasp the significance of
actions until it is too late to react effectively, than
surprise is successful. The principles of Security and
Simplicity are important elements of surprise. It is unlikely
an operation could achieve surprise if its security was lax or
its plans too complex.
In war, the side which best masters the principle of
Concentration of Effort will frequently win, even against a
numerically superior enemy. Concentration enables one side to
overwhelm the other at a specific and decisive point. Victory
at the decisive point opens the way for further victories. In
this way the battle, and eventually the war, is won. The
principles of Flexibility, Economy, and Unity form essential
parts of the process of concentration. Before an army can
concentrate its effort their must be unity of purpose. Some
areas must exercise economy of force as they shift assets
toward the concentration point. Plans will need flexibility
to deal with the unforeseen and still meet the needs for
concentration.
A leader in battle should consider as many principles of
war as possible and then choose those most suitable to his
situation and personality. In the face of a massive Soviet
16
offensive, Manstein instinctively used these three basic
Principles of War to their fullest advantage in the Winter of
1942-43. Whenever and wherever possible against the Soviets,
he planned; 1) to wrest the initiative from them; 2) surprise
them with an attack; 3) concentrate his effort to maximize his
success. He accomplished these steps at the strategic level
and relied upon his subordinates to achieve them at the
tactical level. In this way he was able to make the most of
every opportunity. His acuity culminated with the delivery of
a decisive counterattack during a situation where the safest,
most prudent thing for a German commander to do was retreat.
17
III. SIXTH ARMY IN DANGER
A. BACKGROUND
Operation "Barbarossa" nearly destroyed the Soviet Union
in 1941, but the offensive ground to halt just short of
Moscow. In 1942 Axis forces renewed their offensive in late
Spring. During that Sumner and into Fall Soviet forces again
took a severe pounding. Their retreats continued but were
more orderly than in 1941. Axis forces missed an early
opportunity to take Stalingrad while it was lightly defended.
When the Axis tried a second time the Soviets were well dug
in. Throughout the Fall a battle of attrition developed amid
the ruins of Stalingrad. Both sides were locked in a bloody
stalemate over possession of the city. The Germans sought to
interdict movement on the Volga River, and, the Soviets hoped
to generate as many Axis casualties as possible in the cramped
house to house fighting. They remained engaged in this way
until the early hours of 19 November 1942. (See Figure 1)
B. MANSTEIN ASSUMES OCMMAND
On 19 November 1942, reports from the area around
Stalingrad to Oberkommando des Heeres, the German Army High
Command, (O.K.H.) described heavy fighting north and south of
the city. Soviet force strength and objectives were unclear.













Figure 1 Strategic Status Southern Wing East Front 18 NOV 1942
19
November 1942, Manstein received orders to assume command of
30
Army Group Don, a new formation. Manstein was to use Army
Group Don "to bring the enemy attacks to a standstill and
recapture the positions previously occupied by [Axis
forces]." Manstein had an incomplete picture of events near
Stalingrad. He understood the possibilities given his
knowledge of Axis and Soviet dispositions prior to the attack.
And, he clearly saw no possibility of stabilizing the
situation any time soon. Before leaving Vitebsk he made it
clear to O.K.H. that to restore the situation he would need a
full strength Army assembled in reserve, to commit at the
decisive time and place. General Zeitzler, the new Army Chief
of Staff, agreed but only promised one additional Panzer
division and three infantry divisions. J* Manstein also
expressly telegraphed instructions to Sixth Army, ordering a
withdrawal to the Don crossings at Kalach. He left Vitebsk
by train on 21 November.
In Smolensk, Manstein spoke with Field Marshal Hans
Guenther von Kluge, commander of Army Group Center. Kluge
30 Manstein, Lost Victories . 294. Hq., Army Group Don,
controlled Fourth Panzer Army, Sixth Army, and Third Rumanian
Army. Fourth Rumanian Army was under Fourth Panzer Army.
31 Ibid., 294.
32 Ibid., 295.
Alan Clark, Barbarossa, The Russian-German Conflict.
1941-45 (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1965), 224. It is unclear
whether the telegraph ever made it through channels to 6th
Army.
20
offered advice concerning Hitler's inflated opinion of himself
as a military strategist and his tendencies toward micro-
management of his subordinates. For the first time Manstein
was to be directly under Hitler's command and considered
Kluge's advice carefully. 34
Not until 24 November did Manstein obtain a clear picture
of events around Stalingrad, when he arrived at Starobyelsk,
Army Group B Headquarters (Hq.). He also learned Hitler had





By 15 October 1942, German intelligence concluded the
Russians would eventually attempt an offensive in the
Stalingrad area. It was believed, however, that an attack
would first come against Army Group Center near Smolensk.
Alexander Stahlberg, Bounden Duty: The Memoirs of a
German Officer 1932-1945 , Translated by Patricia
Crampton (London: Brassey's, 1990), 212. Hitler was always
more concerned with details than strategic thinking and
frequently intervened in military activities down to battalion
1 evel
.
David Downing, The Devil's Virtuosos: German Generals
at War 1940-45 (New York: St. Martin's Press Inc., 1977),
117. Against all advice from his Staff, Goering promised
Hitler he would keep Sixth Army supplied by air. Hitler chose
to accept the frivolous boast, and ordered Sixth Army to stand
fast in anticipation of relief and supply by air.
21
Despite growing evidence to the contrary, this idea was
maintained as late as 6 November 1942.
As early as 4 October 1942, the Soviets had begun to
reinforce ten armies around Stalingrad in preparation for
their offensive. With approximately one million troops and
900 tanks they had a two to one superiority over the Axis
forces, many of whom were Rumanian. At the points of attack,
Soviet superiority could reach as high as eight to one (See
Figure 2). 37
2. Execution
At 08:50 on 19 November, 1942, Soviet armies of the
Southwestern Front (under General N. F. Vatutin) began
offensive operations north of Stalingrad. On the first day
elements of the Soviet Fifth Tank Army had advanced twenty-
five kilometers and smashed several Rumanian units. The 22nd
Panzer division, assigned as reserves for Third Rumanian Army,
might have stabilized the situation but circumstances allowed
it to field only twenty tanks on the nineteenth. These were
Earl Frederick Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin: The
German Defeat in the East (Washington D. C. : Office of the
Chief of Military History, U. S. Army, 1968), 48-49.
37 Ibid., 52.
22
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Figure 2 Operation ••URANUS" 19-23 NOV 1942
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of little use against the 450 tanks of Fifth Tank Army. 38 Of
the Rumanian troops holding the flanks of Sixth Army, Stuka
ace Hans Rudel made the following observation on 19 November:
The weather is bad, . . . We fly low. What troops are
those coming towards us? We have gone more than half way.
Masses in brown uniforms - are they Russians? No.
Rumanians. Some of them are even throwing away their
rifles in order to be able to run faster: a shocking
sight, we are prepared for the worst. We fly the length
of the column heading north, we have now reached our
allies' artillery emplacements. The guns are abandoned,
not destroyed. Their ammunition lies beside them. We
have passed some distance beyond them before we sight the
first Soviet troops. 39
The next morning the Stalingrad Front (under General
A. I. Yeremenko) opened its offensive south of Stalingrad.
Fifty-seventh and Fifty-first Armies only advanced eight
kilometers the first day, but severely "damaged" several Axis
units. 40 The veteran 29th Motorized division nearly stopped
the Stalingrad Front cold but General Frederich von Paul us,
commander of Sixth Army, ordered it into defensive positions
Downing, The Devi 1 ' s Virtuosos , 117. Straw was used
to insulate the tanks from the cold. The straw attracted
mice. The mice nibbled through the rubber insulation on all
the electrical wiring. This made 31 out of 104 tanks
casualties prior to the 19th Nov. While repositioning for
battle the snow-sleeves for the tank-tracks were somehow
mislaid, bringing the number of battle-ready tanks towards the
20 previously mentioned.
Hans Ulrick Rudel, Stuka Pilot (Dublin: Euphorion,
1952), 63-4; quoted in Downing, The Devil's Virtuosos, 113.
40 Louis C. Rotundo, ed. , Bat1 1 e For Stal inarad (New
York: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers,
Inc., 1989), 79.
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an Sixth Army's south flank. The next day Soviet forces
bypassed the 29th and continued west. 4^
The two fronts planned to meet near Kalach, forty-five
miles west of Stalingrad. Late on 22 November, the bridge at
Kalach was captured intact. Soviet columns, using captured
German tanks in the lead, surprised and overwhelmed the German
engineers assigned to demolish it. 2 On 23 November, 1942,
some 240,000 Axis troops with 100 tanks were effectively
encircled around Stalingrad. 43
D. MANSTEIN'S STRATEGIC APPRAISAL
The atmosphere at Hq
.
, Army Group B , was one of
skepticism. Manstein and his Staff remained optimistic and
anxious to join the battle. On the journey south Manstein
formulated his plans. He believed, in the vastness of Russia,
a commander had to operate like an admiral in the vastness of
the ocean. He worried that O.K.H. and the very name of his
41 Downing, The Devil's Virtuosos , 118.
42 Ibid.
43 John Erickson, The Road To Berlin (Colorado: Westview
Press, 1983), 2, 25-27. As late as 22 December 1942, Colonel
Vinogradov, intelligence officer on the Don Front, estimated
the strength of encircled axis forces at 86,000. Of course,
the 218,000 Soviets attacking the pocket met with little




new Army Group Don might conspire to pin him to a point on a
map.
Manstein focused on two main considerations. First,
German forces faced the extraordinary numerical superiority of
the Soviet forces. Second, powerful Soviet formations were
closer to certain strategically vital points than their German
counterparts . 45
Defending a front of just over 200 miles, Manstein
believed he was outnumbered seven to one. 46 His estimates may
have been inaccurate given his limited intelligence
capabilities. However, Army Group Don clearly faced greater
numbers of Soviet troops, tanks, aircraft and artillery in
late November 1942.
Manstein considered two distances of strategic
significance. First, the Soviet bridgehead at Kremenskaya on
the Don River, from which powerful mechanized forces had
already attacked, was only 185 miles from the Don crossings at
Rostov. The Fourth Panzer Army, south of the Don, was at
least 200 miles from Rostov. Army Group A, deep in the
Stahlberg, Bounden Duty , 215.
45 Manstein, Lost Victories . 368.
Ibid., 370. One reason for this high estimate was
that he emphasized the number of formations rather than actual
strength. Of course numbered formations are easier to account
for on the battlefield than actual strength. He counted
341:32 in favor of the Soviets. His choice of 7:1 was based on
a rough estimate of Soviet inferiority on a one to one basis
to German formations.
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Caucasus, was at least 375 miles from those vital crossings.
Second, the Soviets at Kremenskaya were only 260 miles from
the Dnieper crossings. Fourth Panzer Army and Army Group A
were 440 and 560 miles, respectively, from those crossings.
The supplies and communications for three German armies had to
pass through Rostov. Similarly, the entire southern wing of




Personal experience helped Manstein clarify the danger.
In the summer of 1941, he had advanced into the Soviet Union
190 miles in four days with 56th Panzer Corps. He had done so
against tougher opposition than the Soviets now faced on the
4ft
Don. *° To make matters worse, Manstein was unable to command
all the friendly units that affected his situation. Army
Group Don was just one of three on the German southern wing.
If the Soviets were able to take one or both of the
crossings before the Germans could withdraw their forces, the
resulting encirclement would unhinge the entire Eastern Front.
The war would be significantly shortened. Hitler refused to
see the danger
.
To deal decisively with his strategic situation, Manstein
developed a basically simple plan, to be executed in four
stages. First, the Sixth Army would be relieved and withdrawn
47 Ibid. , 369.
48 Ibid., 370.
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from Stalingrad as soon as possible. This had to be
accomplished in a way that preserved Sixth Army's fighting
strength. He saw that an intact and mobile Sixth Army was
more valuable than possession of Stalingrad amid a sea of
Russians. If Sixth Army could not be withdrawn intact then it
should stay in Stalingrad and, by continued resistance , tie up
as many Soviet forces as possible. Second, assuming a
successful relief operation, Sixth Army and reinforcements
would stabilize the lower Don. This would allow safe transit
through Rostov. Third, Army Group A and Fourth Panzer Army
would pull out of the Caucasus, positioning themselves to meet
a Soviet thrust in the central Ukraine. Again it was clear to
Manstein that mobile German forces operating against Soviets
in the Ukraine were more valuable than possession of the
Caucasus. Finally, any new forces would concentrate somewhere
around Kharkov and be ready to attack the northern flank of an
4Q
enemy advancing on the Dnieper crossings. "
Manstein arrived at Novocherkassk, Hq. , Army Group Don, on
25 November 1942. 50 He gathered first hand knowledge of his
situation. The most powerful German formation in the area was
Sixth Army, with five Corps, including one Panzer Corps. 51
Surrounded by potent Soviet forces, it had no operational
49 Ibid., 371-372, 304-306.
50
Downing, The Devil's Virtuosos , 120.
Walter Goerlitz, Paulus and Stalingrad (New York:
The Citadel Press, 1963), 220.
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freedom. With each passing day it became weaker. On paper
Sixth Army was under Manstein's command but in reality Hitler
maintained close personal control over its operations. He
sent Major von Zitzewitz with an O.K.H. signal section to
Sixth Army Hq.
.
Zitzewitz was to monitor developments in the
pocket and report directly to Hitler. 52 Operational
coordination with Sixth Army promised to be difficult at best.
Fourth Panzer Army was southwest of the pocket and had
only two intact formations, the German 16th Motorized Division
and the Rumanian 18th Division. The 16th Motorized Division
extended north and south of Yelista. It protected the rear of
Army Group A and had little operational freedom. The Rumanian
18th Division and the remnants of the Rumanian Fourth Army
held positions around Kotelnikovo. 53
Forty miles west of the pocket, 48th Panzer Corps had
fought out of encirclement and held along the lower Chir
River, maintaining a bridgehead at Nizhne Chirskaya. The
Corps consisted of only the 22nd Panzer Division, whose status
was mentioned earlier, and the newly formed Rumanian 1st
Armoured Division with no combat experience.
Northwest of the pocket the Rumanian Third Army had only
three divisions intact and only so because those divisions
52 Ibid., 210.





were too far north to be attacked. Only three Runanian
divisions under General Lascar put up effective resistance but
were surrounded and destroyed quickly. " Of the two Rumanian
armies, totalling twenty-two infantry divisions, only four
divisions were still fit for battle.
By 28 November a total of 143 Soviet combat formations
(i.e., divisions, armoured brigades, etc.) had been identified
within the operations area of Army Group Don. Despite their
numerical superiority the Soviets paused several days to gauge
their success and be sure Sixth Army was trapped. Manstein
57
used every hour to improve his situation.
Three problems immediately impacted Manstein' s plans.
First, Hitler had his own ideas on how to conduct the war,
refusing to allow a withdrawal from Stalingrad or the
Caucasus. Second, O.K.H. did not easily grant Manstein
command over all the units affected by his plan. Finally, any
German losses were difficult to replace and would ultimately
degrade the effectiveness of a counterattack. As if dealing
with a numerically superior enemy and an extraordinarily
severe "climate of war" were not enough, Manstein was
constrained by interference from Hitler and O.K.H. throughout





E. OPERATION WINTER STORK"
1 . Background
Manstein approached his strategic problem with an
attitude of "first things first". Every resource had to be
focused on the relief of Sixth Army while there was any chance
of success. He planned to take full advantage of initiative,
surprise and concentration of effort to reach Sixth Army. He
trusted the policy disputes with Hitler and O.K.H. could be
solved somehow. He determined the relief effort would not
fail for any reason that he could control.
Manstein considered two routes to reach the pocket.
First, was an attack from the bridgehead at Nizhne Chirskaya
directly east. He would only have to cover forty miles but
his flanks were open to counterattack. Soviet strength was
considerable along that route. Second, was an attack from the
area near Kotelnikovo directly northeast. This route required
him to cover nearly seventy miles to the pocket. However,
flank protection was provided by the Don river to the north
and the open steppe to the south. Soviet strength was known
CO
to be minimal along this second route.
Manstein decided to concentrate his forces under
Fourth Panzer Army (under General Hermann Hoth) near
Kotelnikovo and strike northeast. 57th Panzer Corps, acquired
from Army Group A, reinforced for the effort. At the right




moment 48th Panzer Corps would join Fourth Panzer Army and
attack from Nizhne Chirskaya. Also Sixth Army was to attack
southwest. Soviet forces would be caught between three
59
attacks and crushed.
For success, Manstein relied on three conditions.
First, German reinforcements had to be made available and
assembled quickly. Second, Soviet forces had to continue
their low level of activity. Finally, Sixth Army had to be
adequately supplied by air. Unfortunately, none of these
conditions would be met. All three broke down.
Sixth Army required 550 tons of supplies per day to
mount offensive operations and 300 tons per day just to
survive. Reich Marshal Goering promised Hitler he would
deliver 600 tons per day by air. Only a fraction of Sixth
Army's need was ever met. 60 Each day in the pocket
dramatically reduced its effectiveness. If Sixth Army were to
help in its own rescue the attempt had to be soon. Manstein
had little time to assemble forces equal to the task. To
further complicate things the Soviet Southwest Front started
launching spoiling attacks in early December to interfere with
German build ups along the Chir River and threaten the
59
Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin , 61.
See Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, 59; Goerlitz, Paul us
and Stalingrad
. 251. The average lift to Sixth Army was 97.3
tons/day between 1-12 December, 1942, and 137.7 tons/day
between 12-31 December. After that the average sank
dramatically.
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northern flank of any relief effort. 61 It was doubtful 48th
Panzer Corps could join the relief effort as planned.
It appeared Fourth Panzer Army was going to have to
operate with little support from Sixth Army or 48th Panzer
Corps. Manstein struggled to make it as powerful as possible
and attack at the earliest opportunity. Army Group A refused
to transfer 3rd Panzer Corps to Manstein. Field Marshal Ewald
von Kleist, commander of Army Group A, claimed that to release
the Corps he would have to evacuate a salient Hitler wished
retained. Kleist also refused to relieve 16th Motorized
Division from its positions near Yelista though it was
guarding an Army Group A flank. 17th Panzer Division and
306th Infantry Division were assigned to Manstein but
subsequently delayed by O.K.H. in a reserve status. They were
to guard against possible Soviet attacks that, had they
occurred, these two divisions could not have mastered (See
Figure 3). 62
61 Robert G. Walters, "Order Out of Chaos: A Study of
the Application of AuftracrstaJctik by the 11th Panzer Division
During the Chir River Battles 7-19 December 1942" (Master's
Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1989), 30 - 51. Between
7 and 19 December, 1942, the Soviet 5th Tank Army made several
attacks over the Chir River against 48th Panzer Corps (11th
Panzer and 336th Infantry divisions). In heavy fighting
German tactical expertise was able to defeat the numerically
superior Soviets but 48th Panzer Corps was unable to
participate in "Winter Storm". During these raids Soviet
forces frequently committed atrocities upon German prisoners.

















Figure 3 Operation "Winter Storm" 12-23 DEC 1942
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2 . Execution
Despite these setbacks Manstein began operation
"Winter Storm" on 12 December 1942. Fourth Panzer Army
advanced from the Kotelnikovo area toward Stalingrad. On each
flank was a Rumanian Corps with 57th Panzer Corps (23rd and
6th Panzer Divisions, totaling 232 tanks °~) spearheading. The
Soviets were apparently surprised by the timing of the attack.
They believed the Germans would need a few more days to
assemble their forces and would use the shortest route to the
pocket. For two days German progress was good. Several
Soviet counterattacks were crushed but they continued, as
fresh Soviet troops moved to block 57th Panzer Corps. On 15
December Manstein saw clear indications that a new Soviet
offensive was being prepared to strike Eighth Italian Army
under Army Group B, on his left wing. 64 From that area a
successful Soviet attack could cut off Army Group Don and Army
Group A, still deep in the Caucasus. The battle to reach
Sixth Army had only a few more days to run.
By 16 December Hoth had reached the Aksay River within
forty miles of the pocket. The time was right for 48th Panzer
Corps to join the attack with its two divisions. Between the
9th and the 13th of December Soviet pressure against 48th
Panzer Corps was constant. Forced to travel at night and
63 Ericksan, The Road to Berlin . 8.




fight all day it destroyed several Soviet formations piecemeal
but exhausted itself in the process. Yet with two days rest
48th Panzer Corps was in position on 17 December to assist the
relief effort. A series of Soviet attacks on the 18th, along
the Chir River, forced 48th Panzer Corps to abandon its
offensive role in the relief effort. Instead it continued to
chew up attacking Soviet Corps from Fifth Tank Army and
assisted the relief effort in that fashion. 65
December 18th was a day of crisis. Despite the
arrival of 17th Panzer Division, 57th Panzer Corps was unable
to achieve anything decisive in the face of continual Soviet
attacks. Fighting on the lower Chir was heavy. There the
Soviets directly threatened the primary resupply airfield for
Sixth Army at Tatsinskaya. News from the Army Group's left
wing was grim. A major Soviet offensive was moving rapidly
southwest from the upper Chir. Most of Eighth Italian Army
and Third Rumanian Army were in full retreat or had
disappeared altogether. Several ad hoc German units formed
into Army Detachment Hollidt offered the only Axis defense in
the area. "Winter Storm" had to reach a decision in a few
days. 66
Manstein initiated a flurry of comnnunications between
Hitler, O.K.H., General Paulus (Sixth Army), and Kleist (Army
65 Walters, "Order Out Of Chaos", 35-40,
66 Manstein, Lost Victories. 331-332.
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Group A). If the relief operation was to succeed at this late
date several things had to happen. First, Hitler had to be
convinced to abandon Stalingrad. On this issue Hitler
received several conflicting reports concerning the
feasibility of holding Stalingrad and the risk of attempting
en
a breakout. He refused to see the logic of Manstein's
argument.
Second, reinforcements had to continue strengthening
Army Group Don. O.K.H. was sending all available forces to
Army Group B where the Eighth Italian Army was shattering
under Soviet attacks. Political considerations of Italy as an
Axis partner weighed heavily on that action. Even if Manstein
could reverse that priority it was too late for those
reinforcements to help a relief effort whose success depended
on days. 68
Third, Paulus had to be convinced to take action,
violating Hitler's orders and breaking out of the pocket,
abandoning Stalingrad. German military tradition is filled
with instances where commanders acted without or even against
67 See Goerlitz, Paulus and Stalingrad , 210; Manstein,
Lost Victories , 334-338; Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, 62-65;
Stahlberg, Bounden Duty , 227-231. Paulus was a mild mannered
commander allowing too much freedom among his subordinates.
Hitler received reports on Sixth Army from several
personalities in the pocket and was free to pick and choose
those suited to his purpose. Sources were: Sixth Army Chief
-
of-Staff, Major General Arthur Schmidt, General of Artillery,
Walter von Seydlitz-Kurzbach, Major von Zitzewitz. Such
group-thinks were extremely rare in German military tradition.
00 Manstein, Lost Victories , 332.
37
orders to take what they believed to be correct action. o:7
Paulus considered his situation, the orders from Hitler, and
the counsel of his Staff, and for whatever reason refused to
attack toward Fourth Panzer Army.
Fourth, Kleist had to allow some of his forces to be
transferred to Fourth Panzer Army. 3rd Panzer Corps and 16th
Motorized Division were fresh formations within marching
distance of Kotelnikovo. For his own reasons Kleist remained
against transferring those units to Manstein. Hitler
considered possession of the Caucasus oil fields vital to
Germany and was only too willing to support Kleist' s argument
70
against Manstein.
On 19 December 57th Panzer Corps successfully crossed
the Aksay and drove north to the Mishkova River, only 30 miles
from the pocket. The Soviets threw in fresh reserves,
71
stopping 57th Panzer Corps on the Mishkova. fX Manstein
assembled 3000 tans of supplies on truck convoys ready to move
behind 57th Panzer Corps into the pocket. This was the last
chance for Sixth Army to save itself. Manstein was unable to
The Battle of Koeniggraetz in the Austro-Prussian War,
The campaign around Sedan in the Franco-Prussian War, the
Battle of Tannenburg in World War One, and several instances
in World War Two.
70 See Downing, The Devi 1 ; s Virtuosos , 129; Manstein,
Lost Victories , 332.
71
Erickson, The Road to Berlin, 15. 2nd Guards Army
under Malinovski was one of the most formidable in the Red
Army. Originally it was to attack the pocket but was pulled
out to stop 57th Panzer Corps at the Mishkova.
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convince Hitler to allow a breakout. From his sources in the
pocket Hitler believed Paul us' supplies too low to allow a
breakout anyway. As official ccmnander of Sixth Army Manstein
ordered Paul us to breakout immediately and accepted full
responsibility for the outcome. From December 19th until
23rd, Fourth Panzer Army held off relentless Soviet attacks on
the Mishkova. Manstein desperately tried to coax Paulus to
action. Paulus refused to act against Hitler's direct order
to hold Stalingrad. Faced with a stagnate Paulus, Manstein
could no longer ignore events on his left wing. On 23
December, 6th Panzer Division was ordered north from 57th
Panzer Corps. Its tanks needed to stabilize the situation
along the middle Don.
The Soviet operation "Little Saturn" was threatening
to slice off the entire German southern wing on the East
Front. "Winter Storm" had failed. Sixth Army was doomed but
could still fight. It did not surrender until early February
1943. During that time it endured unspeakable hardships and
occupied powerful Soviet forces; forces that might have
destroyed Army Group Don. Of Sixth Army Manstein wrote the
following:
"The name of Sixth Army is to shine forth. . . . This
army fulfilled the highest demand that can ever be made of
a soldier—to fight on to the last in a hopeless situation
for the sake of his comrades." ' 3
72 Ibid., 22
'* Manstein, Lost Victories, 442
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The Soviets realized heavy fighting around Stalingrad
would act as a magnet for German forces. Stavka Verkhovnovo
Glavnokonrnandovaniya, the Soviet Supreme Command (STAVKA),
believed a second offensive along the upper Chir River would
meet light resistance and distract the German forces intent
upon the relief of Stalingrad. Operation "Little Saturn"
would begin on 16 December. Southwest Front (under Vatutin)
was to attack with three armies (First Guards, Third Guards,
Fifth Tank), Voronezh Front (under Golikov) would add its
Sixth Army to cover a 200 mile front. The objective was to
eradicate Eighth Italian Army, Third Rumanian Army and Army
Detachment Hollidt (See Figure 4). 74
2 Execution
Facing "Little Saturn", Axis forces stretched thinly,
deploying in one echelon with no operational reserves. On 16
December two factors worked to help the Axis. Inept Soviet
reconnaissance efforts telegraphed their intentions. The
Germans were able to insert fresh troops into the line at the
74 David Glantz, "From the Don to the Dnepr: A Study of
Soviet Offensive Operations December 1942-August 1943" in Art
of War Symposium: A Transcript of Proceedings held Center For
Land Warfare US Army War College 26-30 March 1984 (Carlisle
Barracks: United States Army War College, 1984), 49-52. In
this operation the Soviets enjoyed a 1.8:1 advantage in troops
and a 10:1 advantage in tanks over the Axis forces. Only
about 1/3 of the Axis were German. 370,000 Soviets with 1,170
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Figure 4 Operation "Little Saturn" 16-23 DEC 1942
41
last minute. Also, on the morning of the attack most of the
front lines were shrouded in dense fog. Soviet artillery
missed many key targets. Often attack lanes over river ice
were closed by the Soviet barrage. Aviation support was
impossible. Some commanders chose to shorten the bombardments
but still attacked at the pre-planned time. '° These
circumstances enabled Axis forces to stop the Soviets at
several points on the first day. The second day brought
powerful Soviet reserves into play and resistance turned to
retreat. But for chance, the situation might have been much
worse for Army Group Don.
By 20 December, the Soviets had torn a 100 mile gap in
the Axis line and were driving south and southwest behind Army
Group Don's left flank. 77 Thanks to the disintegration of
Eighth Italian Army and the almost complete elimination of the
Rumanians from the battle, the Soviets advanced nearly
unopposed. STAVKA decided to expand the objectives to include
the capture of Rostov and placed Sixth Army under Southwest
75 Ibid., 67. Elements of 385th Infantry Division and





Ziemke, Stalingrad To Berlin . 68.
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78
Front. ° Only at Millerovo, where the newly formed Fretter-
Pico Group stood its ground, was any resistance offered. ^
With "Little Saturn" in full swing the danger for
Manstein had expanded dramatically. The cream of his armour
was exposed on the open steppe near Kotelnikovo and under
heavy attack. The mass of German infantry on the southern
wing in Russia was surrounded at Stalingrad or "resting"
hundreds of miles south in the Caucasus with Army Group A.
For nearly 200 miles along Army Group Don's north flank Axis
forces were retreating in disarray. Unless decisive action
was taken quickly, the fate of Sixth Army would be shared by
Army Group A and Army Group Don as well. The war would be
decided in short order.
G. "CLIMATE OF WAR"
From his first day as Commander of Army Group Don,
Manstein had to deal with a "climate of war" that would soon
become one of the severest encountered in World War Two. The
struggle to save Sixth Army encompassed each element of that
"climate"; danger, exertion, uncertainty and chance. These
affected Manstein personally and at various levels of his
command.
7ft
'° Erickson, The Road to Berlin , 18.
79 See Manstein, Lost Victories , 377; Glantz, "From the
Don to the Dnepr/' 77. The Fretter-Pico Group contained
remnants from several Axis units and only one fresh division,
the German 3rd Mountain.
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On the evening of 21 November the train Manstein was
traveling on was bombed by partisans. The delay enabled his
conversation with Kluge. 80 At his headquarters in
Novocherkassk, Manstein and his Staff were guarded by a
volunteer detachment of Cossacks. The company of German
infantry in the vicinity could have done little to stop the
Cossacks if they had suddenly become hostile. x During his
efforts to coax Paulus to action, Manstein attempted to fly
into the pocket himself twice. His Staff convinced him to
go
send a representative instead. Personal danger was common
for any German on the East Front; Manstein' s son Gero had been
killed only weeks before he assumed command. Manstein often
disregarded personal safety in the performance of his
duties. 83
The danger to Army Group Don was significant and readily
apparent to Manstein. Sixth Army, one of the most powerful on
the East Front, was surrounded and getting weaker each day.
Fourth Panzer Army committed against powerful enemy forces,
south of the Don River and well east of Rostov. Army
Detachment Hollidt stretched along the entire Chir River (150
miles), its northern flank held only by Eighth Italian Army.
80 Stahlberg, Bounden Duty . 211.
81 Ibid., 217.
°* Manstein, Lost Victories , 314.
83 Stahlberg, Bounden Duty . 232.
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"Little Saturn" seemed capable of reaching Rostov in short
order. This action would cut off Army Group Don and Army
Group A, still deep in the Caucasus. Each formation of Army
Group Don was at considerable risk.
Manstein's personal exertion can only be assumed. But the
units under his command clearly documented their exertions.
In the pocket, starvation, exposure and a growing sense of
hopelessness exhausted the Sixth Army. Such fatigue had to
affect their operations in both planning and execution. On
the lower Chir, 48th Panzer Corps fought around the clock for
eight days before attempting to join the relief effort. Only
renewed Soviet attacks elsewhere prevented it from doing so.
The corps remained engaged in heavy fighting for the duration
of "Winter Storm". To reach the pocket, 57th Panzer Corps
attacked for seven straight days, then held its positions
against constant Soviet attacks for another six days, and
finally conducted a fighting retreat toward Kotelnikovo. It
remained in heavy combat from 12 December until early January
1943. Throughout December, troops of Manstein's most powerful
formations pushed to the limits of their endurance.
In sharp contrast to the exertions of Army Group Don, Army
Group A remained stationary deep in the Caucasus, essentially
at rest. It is uncertain how their different levels of
activity may have influenced their relationship, but Manstein
and Kleist cooperated very little during the crisis. In his
memoirs, Manstein is reluctant to place blame for the
45
situation on Kleist. He cites the atrophy that naturally
springs from static warfare. He points to the
responsibilities of O.K.H. to enforce cooperation. He also
blames the inept and inefficient command practices of Hitler.
Other writers are far more critical of Kleist for the
84problems.
Manstein had to deal with uncertainty in every decision.
His information on events at the front was updated constantly
by an efficient staff but was still hours and sometimes days
old. Information from Sixth Army was still confused and
sketchy on 24 November, when Manstein made his initial plans.
The nature of an encirclement battle creates extraordinary
confusion for the victim. As rear areas are overrun or
transformed into the front lines, the victim progressively
loses the ability to orient himself and prepare a coherent
response. It would take several days for the situation in and
around the pocket to clarify, but plans had to be made
immediately.
Manstein also had to consider the possible decisions of
other actors. Would Hitler allow a withdrawal from
Stalingrad? Would O.K.H. make forces available when he needed
them? What action was von Paulus prepared to take and when?
Would Kleist realize the danger and cooperate with Manstein?





Germans secure them? The answers to these questions were
important, yet if Manstein had focused too much on their
resolution he would have been frozen with indecision. Instead
he carefully weighed the priorities of several objectives,
then took action to achieve the most important one. Here the
first priority was relief of Sixth Army. Manstein pursued
that goal as long as there was any chance of success, refusing
to let uncertainty distract him.
Chance affected Manstein' s operations frequently as he
attempted to save Sixth Army. Goering promised Hitler that
Sixth Army could be supplied by air. This might have been
accomplished but Goering failed to take any decisive action
beyond his initial promise to implement the airlift. He
failed to give the operation any priority nor did he assign a
competent commander, until it was too late. Every aspect of
"Winter Storm" was affected by the realization that the
airlift was a failure.
The weather had a profound affect on the campaign and was
purely a matter of chance. "Uranus" was planned to start when
the ground was frozen enough for tanks to cross the frozen
rivers. Operations commenced in heavy snow and temperatures
of 20 degrees F. OJ Rivers in the area could become either an
impregnable defensive wall of ice floes or a highway around
the enemy's flank, depending on a few degrees of the
85 Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin , 53,
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thermometer. Sudden fog dramatically affected "Little Saturn"
in its first moments. If the weather becomes severe enough
tactical military objectives shift from destroying the enemy
to securing shelter for the evening. Possession of that
shelter could decide an overnight battle. Weather was one of
the most important elements of chance on the Russian
battlefield in winter.
While the Germans had little regard for their allies'
fighting abilities, no amount of planning could have
effectively compensated for their allies' extraordinarily poor
performance under fire. Several entire Rumanian divisions
simply fled the battlefield at rumor of the Soviet advance.
Their officers often lead the rout. The Italians performed
only slightly better. Often, German formations sent to
bolster the allies, found themselves alone amid a sea of
Soviets. Some isolated allied units did fight well for a
short while. The Axis allies generally placed their German
friends in grave danger from the earliest moments of "Uranus".
Chance was frequently encountered in any operations
involving the Soviets. More than any other German opponent in
World War Two, Soviet performance in battle was unpredictable.
Individual units would fight fanatically one day, and the next
86 Ibid., 59.
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day surrender at the first shot. 87 Strong central control
over Soviet formations restricted initiative on the
battlefield. Opportunities which German units instinctively
exploited would go apparently unnoticed by similar Soviet
units. German commanders were often pleasantly surprised by
inept Soviet operations but these became fewer as the war
progressed. Germans had to plan for the worst case.
During the effort to save Sixth Army Manstein used those
qualities that made him a military genius to recognize and
master the "climate of war" he faced. Whenever possible he
used the principles of initiative, surprise and concentration
of effort to their fullest advantage. At the first
opportunity he seized the initiative with "Winter Storm".
Surprise during the first days of the operation acted as a
force multiplier for Manstein. The two Panzer divisions of
57th Panzer Corps made astounding progress against a
numerically superior opponent who was fresh from a victory.
Once he had chosen his point of attack, Manstein made every
effort to concentrate his forces at that point. By stretching
his forces elsewhere he ran a considerable risk. The success
of "Little Saturn" was due in part to the thinned Axis forces.
His principles were sound. Difficulties arose from disputes
among the German commanders. Unable to save Sixth Army,
87 Department of the Army, Russian Combat Methods in
World War Two, Pamphlet No. 20-230 (Washington D. C.
:
Government Printing Office, 1950), 3-7.
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IV. THE SOUTHERN WING IN DANGER
A. OPERATIONS AROUND ROSTOV
1 . Background
To stem the Soviet tide around his north flank,
Manstein desperately needed to move strong units into that
area. Only after considerable debate was Manstein able to
convince Hitler to allow 6th Panzer Division to leave 57th
Panzer Corps. Hitler insisted that the rest of the corps was
to remain in place until the relief effort toward Stalingrad
go
could be renewed. Several formations might still have
played decisive roles in a renewed relief effort: 16th
Motorized Division, 3rd Panzer Corps, SS "Viking" Division, or
7th Panzer Division. All efforts to acquire these units were
blocked by O.K.H. in one way or another. Hitler had the
unreal istically fantastic idea that an SS Panzer Corps,
forming near Kharkov, would be ready by Mid-February to drive
the 350 miles to Sixth Army's relief. Concerning a
conversation with Manstein about the actions of Hitler and
O.K.H. at this time, General Wolfram von Richthofen, commander
88 Ziemke, Stalingrad To Berlin, 68-70. Hitler
authorized "elements" of 57th Panzer Corps to move to guard
Morozovsk and Tatsinskaya, essential air bases for 6th Army
supplies. The rest of 57th Corps was to stay on Mishkova
River. Hitler informed Manstein, as if it would make all the
difference, that one battalion of Tiger tanks being sent by
rail would cross into Russia that day.
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of Luftflotte 4, wrote in his diary, "we [Richthofen and
Manstein] both feel the same - that we're like a couple of
attendants in a lunatic asylum" (See Figure 5). 89
2 . Execution
On 24 December the Soviets moved to seize the
initiative from Manstein in the Kotelnikovo area. The Second
Guards Army and Fifty-First Army (149,000 men, 635 tanks,
1,500+ guns) opened a major attack against Fourth Panzer Army
(17th and 23rd Panzer Divisions and two Rumanian Corps). 7V
In three days of heavy fighting the Soviets smashed the
Rumanian formations and attempted to outflank Fourth Panzer
Army to the south. The Germans conducted a fluid defense
while slowly retreating toward Rostov. On 29 December, Second
Guards Army took Kotelnikovo. In these operations Fourth
Panzer Army chose not to offer inadequate resistance along its
entire front but to keep its forces concentrated. Instead, it
was able to offer strong opposition at vital points and
deliver surprise attacks whenever an opportunity presented
itself. This left some areas with little or no defenses but
OQ
See Downing, The Devi 1 ' s Vi rtuosos , 129; Goerlitz,
Paul us and Stalingrad , 282.
90 Erickson, The Road to Berlin , 22-23. Fourth Panzer
Army strength at 24 December can be estimated at around
30,000-60,000 men, 100-150 tanks. This is given the transfer
of 6th Panzer Division and several prior days of offensive
operations.
91 Rotundo, ed. , Battle for Stalingrad , 128.
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Figure 5 Army Group Don Under Pressure 23 DEC 1942 - 7 JAN
1943
allowed Axis forces to gain the initiative locally whenever
they wanted . **
On 24 December, the airfield and rail junction at
Tatsinskaya fell to the Soviet 24th Tank Corps (under General
V. M. Badanov). In two days it had covered 120 miles, overrun
the base, destroyed everything it found, and had dug in around
the town while waiting to be relieved. 6th Panzer Division
92 Manstein, Lost Victories , 386,
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joined 11th Panzer Division near Tatsinskaya with orders to
retake the vital junction immediately. 24th Tank Corps put up
an exceptional defense by Soviet standards. After four days
of fighting Badanov withdrew to the northeast with the
remnants of his formation. On 29 December, Tatsinskaya, only
60 miles from Rostov, was retaken by the Axis.
Not until 23 December were the Soviet units of "Little
Saturn" encountering any effective resistance. The gaps they
had torn in the Axis lines were slowly being filled, but only
after the Soviets had gained several hundred square miles of
territory. At Chertkovo, between 6,000 and 10,000 Germans and
Italians were surrounded. On 23 December, 19th Panzer
Division occupied a 40 kilometer sector of the front and began
operations to relieve Chertkovo. At Millerovo, Fretter-Pico
Group (3rd Mountain, and 304th Infantry Divisions) was heavily
engaged in an all-round defense of that vital road and rail
junction. Between Millerovo and the Chir River Army
Detachment Hollidt (62nd, 294th, 336th, 387th Infantry, and
6th, 7th, and 11th Panzer Divisions) put up the stiffest
resistance, retreating only when it had to. As Badanov had
done, powerful Soviet units were bypassing Axis positions at
93 See Glantz, "From the Don to the Dnepr," 79-81;
Erickson, The Road To Berlin . 19-22. For this action 24th
Tank was renamed 2nd Guards Tank Corps and Badanov became the
first recipient of the "Order of Suvorov". German defenders
at Tatsinskaya were all killed and many were tortured and
mutilated, to be found later by the Panzer divisions.
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Chertkovo and Millerovo. These forces were trying to get
94behind Army Group Don.
Soviet pressure on Rostov was growing. It was clear
to Manstein that all German forces in the Caucasus should have
been withdrawn toward the Central Ukraine immediately. As
early as 20 December, 1942, Manstein had pointed out, to
General Zeitzler, Army Chief of Staff, the developing danger
to Rostov and Army Groups Don and A. As this crisis
developed, Army Group A refused to allow Manstein control over
any of its units and O.K.H., whose place it was to order a
transfer, did nothing. But O.K.H. did consider putting Army
Group A under Manstein 's command. This was a condition set by
Manstein for his acceptance of the command of Army Group Don.
Neither Hitler nor Kleist, the latter equal in rank to
Manstein, was able to invoke a decision from O.K.H. placing
one army group under the other. Considering the egos of both
men, O.K.H. could not see a way in which one army group could
function under the command of the other. The two Army Groups
continued to operate separately. At Manstein' s insistence,
Hitler finally selected 29 December to order a limited
withdrawal of Army Group A, which was still deep in the
94 See Glantz, "From the Don to the Dnepr" 76-79;
Manstein, Lost Victories , 388-389.
95 Manstein, Lost Victories , 378.
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Caucasus. Yet he still had no intention of giving up the
Caucasus front as a whole.
Army Group Don continued to be stretched to the limit
by Soviet attacks and Hitler's meddling. On 2 January, 1943,
in a dispatch to Zeitzler, Manstein no longer concealed his
irritation at the slow evacuation from the Caucasus. He
accused Zeitzler, Kleist and even Hitler of serious
procrastination, perhaps causing the loss of large quantities
97
of equipment.
In response to Hitler's repeated attempts to restrict
operational freedom and his refusal to reinforce the 4th
Panzer Army, fighting to protect Army Group A, Manstein asked
to be relieved of command on 5 January, 1943. His message to
O.K.H. stated:
"Should these proposals not be approved and this
headquarters continue to be tied down to the same extent
as hitherto, I cannot see that any useful purpose will be
served by my continuing as commander of Don Army Group.
In the circumstances it would appear more appropriate to
replace me by a 'sub-directorate' of the kind maintained
by the Quartermaster-General . " 98
Of course, his resignation was not accepted, but he had made
a point
.
Ibid., 379-382. Manstein sees Army Group A's
inability to withdraw from the Caucasus as a paramount danger.
He condemns troops, Staffs and indirectly, Kleist, for
allowing stagnation to gain the upper hand. Army Group A had
accumulated weapons, equipment and stores of all kinds and had
come to regard them as indispensable.






On 7 January, a small Soviet force appeared twelve
miles from Manstein's Hq. at Novocherkassk and only thirty-
five miles from Rostov. Some tanks from a repair shop in
Novocherkassk were quickly patched together to meet the
threat. Fortunately, the Soviets turned south toward the rear
of Fourth Panzer Army. Also on that day, elements of 3rd
Guards Tank Corps (under General V. T. Volskii) moved to
within twenty miles of Rostov from the east. Manstein
continued his attempts to influence O.K.H. regarding the
danger to Army Group A and Rostov. Hitler still refused to
allow a withdrawal from the Caucasus. His only move so far
had been to authorize 16th Motorized Division to pull out of
Yelista on 6 January.
Army Detachment Hollidt continued an orderly retreat
toward the Donets River. Hollidt used his panzer divisions as
"fire brigades" for the most dangerous Soviet penetrations.
Axis forces pulled out of Morozovsk, the airfield closest to
Stalingrad, on 5 January. Millerovo was evacuated in the
second week of January. Soviet units continued to bypass the
stronger Axis positions around Chertkovo as they drove further
west. Soviet forces seemed poised to take Rostov any day,
trapping Army Group A and Fourth Panzer Army in the Caucasus.
However, unknown to Manstein, "Little Saturn" had run its
99 See Manstein, Lost Victories , 387; Downing, The
Devi 1 ' s Virtuosos . 132; Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin . 74.
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course by early January. STAVKA was shifting its attention to
a new offensive along the upper Don River.
B. OPERATIONS ON THE UPPER DON RIVER
1 . Background
Along the upper Don, Axis forces were exposed in a
small salient. The Second Army and the Second Hungarian Army
still occupied positions held on 19 November, 1942. The
remnants of Eighth Italian Army held a lengthening southern
flank for Army Group B. STAVKA planned to attack along the
entire 300 mile Front of Army Group B with five fresh
Armies. The Soviets envisioned three steps. The first
step was to encircle and destroy Second Hungarian Army. The
next to do the same to Second Army which would be vulnerable
after the Hungarians were destroyed. And finally, there would
be a general advance to the west with Kharkov as the primary
objective. While not directed at Army Group Don per se, any
Soviet successes on the upper Don would eliminate valuable
Axis forces and further threaten Manstein's north flank (See
Figure 6). 102
100 Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin , 74-75.
101 See Albert Seaton, The Russo-German War 1941-45 , (New
York: Praeger Publishers, 1971.), 341-343; Erickscn, The Road
to Berlin, 32-35. Thirteenth Army of Bryansk Front under
Reiter; Thirty-Eighth Army, Sixtieth Army, Fortieth Army of
Voronezh Front under Golikov; Third Tank Army of Southwest
Front under Vatutin.
102 Seaton, The Russo-German War 1941-45 , 341.
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Figure 6 Soviet One-Two Punch on Army Group B 13 - 24 JAN 1943
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2 . Execution
On 13 January, 1943, the Soviets opened their
offensive along the upper Don. Third Tank Army and Fortieth
Army penetrated the Hungarian front at several spots. On 14
January, 15th Tank Corps overran the Hq. of 24th Panzer Corps,
the only potent Axis formation in the area. On 18
January, Alexeievka fell to the Soviets. This effectively
trapped most of Second Hungarian Army, the Italian Alpine
Corps, and elements of 24th Panzer Corps. 1 4 The Germans
were unable to defend a 200 mile stretch of the front, between
Voronezh and Voroshi 1 ovgrad
.
In order to deal with the situation on his north
flank, Manstein proposed two options to Hitler. The first was
to use all reinforcements to stop the Voronezh Front far
enough east to prevent Second Army and Army Group Don from
being completely outflanked. The drawback was that it would
further weaken efforts to hold Rostov and might still prove
unsuccessful . The second option had been conceived by
Manstein in late November but he had been unable to enlighten
Hitler or O.K.H. to its merits. It involved assembling strong
offensive forces north and south of the Soviet penetrations.
At the right time, these two groups would strike the Soviet
1 0"^
Erickson, The Road to Berlin , 33.
104 See Seaton, The Russo-German War 1941-45 , 342;
Erickson, The Road to Berlin . 34. This action cost the Axis
nearly 232,900 troops in POWs/KIAs/WIAs
.
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flanks, encircling and destroying as many forces as possible.
For option two to succeed Manstein knew the two Panzer Armies
south of Rostov would have to be "leap-frogged" from his
southern to the northern flank. This too was a move whose
merits Hitler and O.K.H. seemed unable to grasp. As of 24
January, no decision had been reached on the movement of Army
Group A, which remained deep in the Caucasus. Hitler,
refusing to listen to Manstein' s ideas, vacillated until
events decided for him.
C. A TURNING POINT
1 . Crisis
On 20 January, four Soviet corps attacked between
Fourth Panzer Army and the Don River. Their aim was to pin
the 57th Panzer Corps with one group while the another drove
directly west for Rostov. If successful, both Army Group A
and Fourth Panzer Army would be trapped south of the Don.
Soviet tanks soon reached the airfield at Rostov.
Pressure on Hollidt was also great. East of
Voroshilovgrad three Soviet armies conducted powerful probes
It had been agreed in principle that First Panzer
Army would withdraw from the Caucasus in early January but
endless debate between Kleist, O.K.H. , Hitler and Manstein,
over every detail made action impossible.
106 See Manstein, Lost Victories , 392-393; Ziemke,
Stalingrad to Berlin , 84.
107 Manstein, Lost Victories , 395.
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using every available asset to pin Axis forces in the area.
On 23 January, Soviet spearheads crossed the Donets River west
of Voroshilovgrad. If those units drove south in earnest they
could have cut off all of Army Group Don and Army Group A. ^
On 24 January, in a heavy blizzard, the Bryansk Front
attacked the Second Army near Voronezh. Within days the
Second Army was in full retreat, fighting out of encirclement
on several occasions. By 29 January, Army Group B was
destroyed as a military formation. The disaster on the upper
Don left Manstein's northern flank bare.
Faced with these multiple threats, Manstein had to set
his priorities. The Soviets were conducting offensive
operations over an 800 mile front, and still fighting heavily
around Stalingrad. The only uncommitted formations under
Manstein's command were 11th and 7th Panzer Divisions, both of
which were on their way to meet the Soviets west of
Voroshilovgrad. Manstein realized he would have to transfer
both Fourth and First Panzer Armies to the Donets basin intact
if he were ever to stabilize the region. The only means to
accomplish that was a transit through Rostov. As an emergency
measure Manstein diverted both Panzer divisions from Army
Detachment Hollidt to protect Rostov. Logistical problems
delayed their arrival in the area. When the 11th Panzer
108 Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, 84.
See Ziemke, Stalingrad To Berlin, 81; Erickson, The
Road to Berlin , 34.
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Division (under Major General Hermann Balck) reached Rostov it
began operations (See Figure 7).
2. Decisions
a. Tactical
The 11th Panzer Division quickly drove the Soviets
out of the Rostov airfield. By 23 January the only Soviet
forces west of the Manych River were bottled up in a
bridgehead at Manutchskaya. From there they could launch
further attacks any time. Balck was ordered to take the
bridgehead and as soon as possible since his division was also
needed along the middle Donets.
Powerful Soviet tank forces were dug in amid the
buildings of the town. The initial frontal attacks were
unsuccessful. Balck devised a ruse to draw the Soviets out of
their positions. On 25 January he launched a feint attack
against the far side of town with every available armored car
and "half-track" under cover of a smoke screen and heavy
artillery barrage. The Soviets responded to this apparent
threat to their flank by shifting their tanks toward that side
110 Manstein, Lost Victories , 395-396. Delays were due
to heavy train traffic moving through Rostov to supply the
bridgehead at Taman. Hitler wanted supplies built up in Taman
before Rostov fell yet would not allow the forces which could
protect Rostov to use the trains.
Major General Frederich Wilhelm von Mellenthin,
Panzer Battles. trans. H. Betzler, ed. L. C. F. Turner
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of town. At the right moment the Germans moved their barrage
to the near side of town, where they had been defeated the
previous day, and struck there with every available tank.
Caught out of their positions the Soviet tanks were vulnerable
from the rear by the real German attack. In minutes twenty
Soviet tanks were destroyed and 500-600 Soviet troops killed
or wounded. Balck's losses were one killed and fourteen
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wounded. The Russians fled without destroying the bridge.
The threat to Rostov was eliminated for the moment. 112
The 11th Panzer Division was considered by many to
be the most capable Panzer division to serve on the East
Front. It had distinguished itself during the Chir River
battles in December. When called upon to defend Rostov it had
been in combat for two months with little rest. Its actions
near Rostov provide a fine example of the tactical skill
Manstein could count an from his subordinates. Battles like
the one at Manutchskaya between Germans and Soviets were
common during the Winter of 1942-43. This confidence in
German tactical superiority over the Soviets played an
important part in Manstein' s estimations of what was possible
during "that Winter."
b. Strategic
The close call near Rostov and Soviet pressure
throughout the Donets basin finally moved Hitler to belated
action. On 22 January Hitler decided that elements, and on 24
January the whole of First Panzer Army should be brought
through Rostov toward the Middle Donets. Manstein was given
comnand of First Panzer Army on 27 January and accelerated the
withdrawal. Manstein shifted his Hq. to Stalino an 29 January
as his efforts moved from the Don to the Donets region. By 31
112 Ibid., 205.
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January First Panzer Army had carpi eted its move through
Rostov. 113
Hitler refused to allow Seventeenth Army to move
through Rostov to the Ukraine. He insisted it hold onto the
Kuban peninsula, near Taman. There, he believed it would be
in an advantageous position for a summer offensive toward the
Caucasian oil fields. Hitler's decision also allowed Soviet
forces to separate elements of First Panzer Army. Two crack
divisions, 13th Panzer and 50th Mountain, were forced to
withdraw to Taman. Powerful Axis forces sat virtually
immobilized on the Kuban Peninsula while Army Group Don was
fighting for its life. If it lost that fight the forces at
Taman also would perish. 114
After two and a half months of successful offensive
operations which killed or captured hundreds of thousands of
Axis troops, STAVKA believed the Axis were on the verge of
collapse on the southern wing of the East Front. Stalin
called for one last offensive to destroy Army Group Don before
the winter ended. However, with First and Fourth Panzer
Armies disengaging from the Rostov area, Manstein possessed a
new freedom of action to meet the Soviet threat.
113 Manstein, Lost Victories . 397-398.
Clark, Barbarossa, 250. The Taman bridgehead (also
known as the Kuban bridgehead) totaled nearly 250,000 German
and over 150,000 Axis satellite troops.
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D. "CLIMftTE OF WAR"
Between 23 December, 1942, and 29 January, 1943, the
"climate of war" on the East Front remained severe. The
danger for Manstein was less personal and more professional.
When Soviet forces appeared only twelve miles from his Hq. on
7 January Manstein was in some personal danger but for the
most part he remained clear of the fighting. For the
formations under his command, however, the danger was real and
constant
.
Powerful Soviet attacks frequently shattered units of the
German allies. In this way, the Germans were constantly faced
with encirclement as Soviet formations bypassed them. This
happened, at Millerovo, at Chertkovo, and to the Fourth Panzer
Army on the Aksay River. The Germans also increased their
risk by conducting a fluid defense. As the Panzer forces
concentrated in strike groups to handle Soviet breakthroughs,
they usually operated without flank protection. German
infantry divisions became responsible for vast stretches of
the line. In the face of a serious attack they could often
only act as a trip wire to warn the Panzer forces of the
breakthrough. Units stretched in this way ran a much greater
risk of disintegrating in combat. While fluid defense
incurred greater risk it also offered the best opportunities




Whole armies were in as much danger as small units. Army
Group A and Fourth Panzer Army would be lost if Rostov fell.
If the Dnieper crossings fell, both those formations and Army
Group Don could die. The reports of Soviet forces across the
Donets, west of Voroshilovgrad, on 23 January heightened that
danger. The very real danger to the entire southern wing on
the East Front must have affected Manstein as he operated in
the days between 23 December 1942 and 29 January 1943.
During this time Manstein was constantly required to do
more with less. The resulting exertion affected every
formation in his command and must have had an indirect affect
upon him. From 23 December to 17 January, for example, the
19th Panzer Division defended a 40 Kilometer sector of the
line essentially alone. It was also tasked with the relief of
the encircled garrison at Chertkovo, making several
unsuccessful attempts to reach it . 115 When Chertkovo fel 1
,
the 19th was itself encircled near Starobyelsk. It continued
fighting and eventually made it back to German lines,
maintaining its cohesion. 116
The 11th Panzer Division remained engaged or rushed to
become engaged in heavy combat throughout this time. Nearly
all the Panzer and Panzer Grenadier divisions of Army Group
Don (6th, 7th, 11th, 16th, 17th, 19th, 23rd) were kept busy as
115 Glantz, "From the Don to the Dnepr;* 77-84.
116 Manstein, Lost Victories , 397.
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the "fire brigades" for fluid defensive operations along the
Group's 450 mile front line. Manstein's infantry fared no
better. The need to identify the Soviet attacks and, when
possible, to offer a credible defense forced them to deploy in
a single echelon while covering great distances. Manstein
continually asked the units under his command to perform to
the limits of their endurance, limits he seemed to grasp
instinctively.
During this time also, Manstein continued to grapple with
uncertainty over every decision. Hitler's indecisions and
their timing complicated Manstein's situation. During this
time Manstein expended great energy trying to convince Hitler
and O.K.H. of the appropriate actions to take. An example of
this was the struggle over the question of whether the
Caucasus should be evacuated because the situation there had
a tremendous influence on how Manstein would conduct his
operations. Hitler vacillated on the matter until the Soviets
decided for him. Hitler also might have allowed the
evacuation as early as 19 November, 1942. Manstein realized
even earlier that any Soviet operation in strength near
Stalingrad would require a withdrawal from the Caucasus. The
uncertainty of Hitler's decisions cost the Axis heavily in men
and material , and was a constant source of frustration for
Manstein.
Soviet actions were an important cause of uncertainty for
Manstein. The timing, location, strength and objectives of
69
the Soviet attacks were difficult to determine. With so many
formations in motion over great distances and frequently
locked in combat, the intelligence services found it difficult
to keep track of the enemy. Raids on Tatsinskaya and the
Rostov airfield further clouded the "truth". Much of
Manstein's information was unreliable. He typically had to
disregard minutiae in favor of a broad strategic appraisal , a
difficult thing for any commander to do.
The performance of Axis units also gave Manstein cause for
uncertainty. The Hungarians proved even less capable than the
Rumanians or Italians at resisting Soviet attacks. The
Soviets attacked Second Hungarian Army a day earlier than
planned when preliminary reconnaissance probes breached the
117
Hungarian lines in several places. Of all the Axis allies
only the Italian Alpine Corps performed with any consistency
on the battlefield. After "Little Saturn", the remnants of
Third Rumanian Army were withdrawn from combat and permanently
restationed in Rumania. 118 Some of Manstein's reinforcements
were Luftwaffe divisions. These were hastily put together to
fill the gaps in the line. They were generally well equipped,
but poorly led. If they survived their baptism of fire, which
was far from certain, their performance afterward usually
proved adequate. With so few troops, Manstein had to rely on
117
Erickson, The Road to Berlin . 33. The 7th Hungarian
Division fled its positions at these probes.
118 Glantz, "From the Don to the Dnepr;' 85.
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every formation to do its part in the fighting. He had more
confidence in some formations than in others.
Chance continued to affect Manstein's operations. The
weather is perhaps the most apparent element of chance on the
battlefield. Between 23 December 1942 and 29 January 1943,
the intense Russian winter made itself felt throughout Army
Group Don's zone of responsibility. Rivers changed
unpredictably, from impassable barriers of slush and ice
floes, to ice roads into the enemy's rear areas. The
devastating attack on Second Army, on 24 January, was launched
I 1Q
in a blizzard and twenty degrees below zero. J"L ^ Low ceilings
impaired air support at a time when the Axis were falling back
and airfields operated dangerously close to the Front. In
contrast, the Soviets advanced too quickly sometimes and found
themselves beyond the reach of their own air support. 12°
Chance is especially a function of uncertainty in war and
also influenced by the presence of danger and exertion. But
for chance, the action at Manutchskaya might have failed,
pinning the 11th Panzer Division in the area and leaving the
Soviets within striking distance of Rostov. The Soviet force
might have overrun Manstein's Hq. on 7 January rather than
turn south and away from Novocherkassk/ perhaps capturing
I 1 QJ--LJ Erickson, The Road to Berlin , 34. There is no
mention here of Fahrenheit or Celsius. Either one is very
cold.




Manstein. The Soviets might have released a few of the seven
armies encircling Stalingrad after "Winter Storm" failed.
These could have made a decisive difference in the effort
against Army Group Don. For Manstein, the "climate of war"
remained severe between 23 December and 29 January.
72
V. OPPORTUNITY IN DftNGH*
A. DONBAS OPERATION
1 . Background
Emboldened by the success of "Uranus" and "Little
Saturn", STAVKA felt capable of a last great offensive before
the Spring thaws halted operations in the Ukraine. STAVKA
intelligence led the Soviets to believe the Axis would
collapse under the new offensive. L-tx The plan called for a
series of attacks along a 900 mile front, from Rostov to
Kursk, liberating an area of the Ukraine called the Donbas.
Stalingrad seemed about to fall, thus freeing several armies
to reinforce the operation. The objectives were ambitious.
First, the newly designated South Front (under General A. R.
I. Malinovsky) would press Rostov from the south and east with
four armies (Second Guards, Fifth Shock, Twenty-Eighth, and
Forty-Fourth). Second, Southwest Front (under Vatutin) would
continue to outflank Army Group Don to the north, turning
south to capture Mariupol on the Sea of Azov, and
121 Downing, The Devi 1 ' s Virtuosos , 138-139. A Soviet
spy network known as "Lucy" was lodged into O.K.W. and O.K.H.
.
For some time it had provided valuable information to STAVKA.
In late January its information was infected by the deep gloom
prevailing at German High Command. It reinforced an already
over-confident STAVKA. "Lucy" had no agents an Manstein's
staff, where there was no gloom, only nervous energy as the
genius maneuvered for advantage.
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simultaneously driving southwest to take the Dnieper
crossings. Vatutin was given four armies (Sixth, First
Guards, Third Guards, and Fifth Tank) to accomplish his
mission. Third, Voronezh Front (under Golikov) would advance
on a broad front toward Kiev, taking Kharkov and Kursk along
the way. Golikov commanded four armies for the mission
(Thirty-Eighth, Sixtieth, Fortieth, and Third Tank). Finally,
Bryansk Front (under General M. A. Reuter) would attack toward
Kursk with two armies (Thirteenth, and Forty-Eighth). There
was to be no offensive pause prior to commencing the Donbas
operation.
Success depended on the effort of Southwest Front.
Vatutin had already advanced a great distance and, without
rest, was tasked with taking two objectives along divergent
lines of advance. If Axis resistance stiffened, his forces
would be unable to support each other. STAVKA bolstered his
armies as best it could, giving Vatutin a two-to-one and four-
to-one advantage in troops and tanks, respectively over the
Axis in his sector. i" All Fronts were to attack between 29
January and 2 February (See Figure 8).
122 Glantz, "From the Don to the Dnepr" 129. Southwest
Front on 29 January 1943 had 325,000 troops and 362 tanks. To
defend the area, the Axis had 160,000 troops and 100 tanks
spread between First Panzer Army, Army Detachment Hollidt and
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Figure 8 Soviet Danbas Operation 29 JAN - 6 FEB 1943
2 . Execution
The Donbas operation began an 29 January as Vatutin's
Sixth Army (under General Kharitonov) advanced toward Kupyansk
on the Oskol River. With the help of Third Tank Army, it took
that city on 2 February. The defending German 298th Infantry
Division was encircled in the fighting but regained Axis lines
after a three day fighting withdrawal. Elements of Sixth Army
took Izyum on 5 February. Here again, the German 320th
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Infantry Division conducted a successful withdrawal from
encirclement, requiring several days to regain Axis lines. ^23
On 30 January, First Guards Army (under General
Kuznetsov) struck the 19th Panzer Division near Kremennaya.
That city fell the next day. On 1 February, elements of First
Guards Army were across the Donets and attempting to surround
Slavyansk, an important rail junction. Only the timely
arrival of the 7th and 3rd Panzer Divisions prevented another
Soviet encirclement. Possession of Slavyansk was considered
vital to the success of both the Soviet offensive and the
German defensive operations. By 6 February fighting was heavy
around the city as both sides poured in every available asset.
Many Soviet units bypassed Slavyansk to the north, taking
Barvenkovo on 6 February. That same day Kuznetsov pushed 19th
and 27th Panzer Divisions out of Lisichansk. 124
To slice through to the Sea of Azov, STAVKA created a
special "Front mobile group" (55,000 troops and 212 tanks)
under the command of General M. M. Popov. Late on 30 January,
Group Popov was introduced into the gap between First Guards
Army and Sixth Army. Yet STAVKA waited to launch Popov south
until Slavyansk was secured. 125
123 Ibid., 137.
124 Ibid., 140-143.
125 See Erickson, The Road to Berlin , 46; Glantz, "From
the Don to the Dnepr," 129, 143-144.
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Voronezh Front joined the offensive on 2 February.
Golikov sent two armies, the Thirty-Eighth and Sixtieth,
toward Kursk and the German Second Army. Toward Kharkov, he
sent three armies, the Fortieth, Third Tank and the newly
formed Sixty-Ninth. Along the approaches to Kharkov, Golikov
enjoyed a three-to-one advantage in troops and tanks. 126
Powerful SS units surprised Third Tank Army (under
General Rybalko) blocking his way and making little initial
1 97
progress. Sixty-Ninth Army (under General Kazakov) also
encountered the SS but attempted an outflanking move to the
north. Fortieth Army (under General Moskalenko) met little
resistance and advanced rapidly, converging on Kharkov from
the northeast. By 5 February the SS units had all but stopped
Rybalko and Kazakov but the progress of Fortieth Army
threatened to undo the SS defensive efforts. On 6 February
Fortieth Army was preparing to assault Belgorod. If
successful, Soviet forces would be across the last major river
obstacle before Kharkov. 128
126 Glantz, "From the Don to the Dnepr," 232. On 2
February Voronezh Front sent 210,000 troops and 615 tanks
toward Kharkov. The Defending Army Detachment Lanz and the
assembling SS Panzer Corps fielded 70,000 troops and 200
tanks.
x<t
' Ibid., 243. The SS Panzer Corps forming near
Kharkov sent elements from two divisions forward to meet
Golikov. These were from SS Panzer Division "Das Reich", and
SS Panzer Division "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler", these were
joined by the Motorized Division "Grossdeutschland".
128 Ibid., 240-251.
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The South Front also joined the offensive on 2
February. Augmented by two armies from Southwest Front, it
conducted a general attack along the lower Donets basin. The
Soviets were attempting to pin as many Axis forces along the
lower Don as possible. While three armies (Fifth Shock,
Second Guards, and Twenty-Eighth) converged on Rostov, Fifth
Tank Army (under General Romanenko) advanced west toward the
Mius River. On 5 February, Third Guards Army (under General
Lelyushenko) began a house to house fight for possession of
Voroshi 1 ovgrad
.
Though Manstein had gained the freedom to pull First
Panzer Army out of the Caucasus, Fourth Panzer Army remained
on the lower Don. It assisted Army Detachment Hollidt in
holding the Donets-Don river line. Separated, the two Armies
could only react to the many Soviet attacks and would
eventually be overwhelmed. Manstein had a plan to bring the
two Panzer Armies together but needed an opportunity to
present it personally to Hitler. He believed that was the
only way, given previous interaction with Hitler, he would be
allowed to implement his ideas in time to be successful. On
3 February, the Sixth Army at Stalingrad finally surrendered
.
Seven Soviet armies were freed to join the fighting. To
underline the perilousness of his situation Manstein showered
O.K.H. with requests for several emergency measures necessary
to stabilize the Donets basin. He called for priority on all
reinforcements and the transfer of several formations from
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Army Groups A and B, to Army Group Don. He also called for an
SS attack from the Kharkov area as soon as possible. Hitler
decided it was time to speak personally with Manstein. 129
B. CONFERENCE AT WOLFSSCHANZE
On 6 February, 1943, Hitler's private plane, a 4-engine
Condor, brought Manstein to East Prussia and Wolfsschanze, the
Fuehrer's headquarters. Here, Manstein had to convince Hitler
of how to forestall the disaster threatening the German
southern wing. He wished to discuss two questions with
Hitler.
The first of these questions was withdrawal from the
eastern part of the Donets basin. Immediate action was
required to disengage forces for the proposed counterattack.
The second question dealt with Hitler's position as Supreme
Commander. Manstein hoped to convince Hitler to relinquish
active command to a qualified professional, or at least choose
a qualified Chief -of-Staff endowed with the appropriate
responsibility and authority. ^0
Manstein was uncertain of Hitler's mood prior to the
conference. His aggressive conduct of operations and frank
comrnunications with O.K.H. could easily have angered Hitler,
especially since he had registered few successes since taking
Manstein, Lost Victories , 406,
130 Ibid., 407.
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over Army Group Don. Hitler's opening remarks were
unexpected, he began:
"Gentlemen, first I would like to say a word about
Stalingrad. I alone bear the responsibility for
Stalingrad, and now, the current situation in the East,
please." 131
This was classic Hitlerian psychology, disarming Manstein
temporarily with the unexpected words. It is uncertain
whether the words held any real conviction, but they did
change the atmosphere of the conference.
Hitler listened calmly while Manstein presented his
appraisal of the military situation, listing the conclusions
to be drawn from it. His argument proceeded logically.
Current German forces were inadequate to hold the area of the
Don and Donets basins. By trying to do so, Germany would soon
lose the area and Army Group Don as well as Army Group A. At
the right moment, Army Group Don should abandon a portion of
the Donets basin. This would conserve forces and enable a
stronger defense of the remaining area.
Manstein then gave his forecast of how the operations
would proceed. With Army Group B almost completely out of
action, powerful Soviet forces were free to advance Southwest
to the lower Dnieper or the Sea of Azov. The success of their
mission would decide the war in the East. The Soviets were
able to draw on the forces around Stalingrad and other
reserves. The SS Panzer Corps and all possible reinforcements
131 Stahlberg, Bounden Duty . 251
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would be unable to stop so powerful a move. Only by pulling
both the First and Fourth Panzer Armies from the lower Don and
concentrating them between the Donets and Dnieper would it be
possible to thwart the Soviet offensive and restore the
situation on the southern wing of the Eastern Front. Only by
an immediate retreat to the Mius, would the front be shortened
enough to allow the Panzer armies to disengage and meet the
Soviet threat. 132
Hitler listened to Manstein calmly, before presenting a
variety of tangential arguments against a retreat to the Mius.
He regarded any statement by Manstein about the future as
sheer hypothesis which might or might not become reality. He
made the excellent point that shortening any of the front
released as many Russians as Germans. The Russians forced to
fight for every foot, would soon be worn out. Germany needed
the coal taken from the Donets basin. Hitler even held
out hopes for an early thaw to stop the Soviets in their
tracks. Throughout the four hour meeting, Hitler calmly
and rationally discussed matters from both economic and
political perspectives. Only once did he mention the
operational position. He believed the SS Panzer Corps capable
132 Manstein, Lost Victories . 408-9.
133 Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, 87. Manstein had
learned earlier that the coal mined east of the Mius River
could not be used either for coking or as locomotive fuel.
i -34,xjn Manstein, Lost Victories , 413.
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of a successful thrust from Kharkov against the Soviet flank.
At that time the Corps only contained two divisions.
Observers said Hitler "displayed . . . his quite astonishing
knowledge of production figures and weapon potentials."
Surprisingly, Hitler concluded his monologue by granting
permission for a withdrawal to the Mius.
It is unclear why Hitler approved the plan. Manstein
expressed frustration that his military appraisal had no
visible affect on the decision, and Hitler so easily
discounted his forecasts. In the face of Hitler's short-term
perspective, Manstein privately defended the long-term outlook
as necessary for strategic planning:
"All considerations of an operational nature are
ultimately based— especially when one has lost the
initiative to the enemy— on appreciations or hypotheses
regarding the course of action which the enemy may be
expected to take. While no one can prove beforehand that
a situation will develop in such-and-such a way, the only
successful military commander is the one who can think
ahead. He must be able to see through the veil in which
the enemy's future actions are always wrapped, at least to
the extent of correctly judging- the possibilities open to
both the enemy and himself."
Emboldened by his success, Manstein brought up his second
question concerning leadership. Hitler remained calm even at
this veiled indictment of his own command qualifications. He
countered by citing the personal disappointments he had
135 Ibid., 411.
136 Clark, Barbarossa, 260.
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experienced with Generals, Werner van Blamberg and Walther von
Brauchitsch. He pointed out that Goering was his successor
and that he could not place anyone above him. The question
138
remained unresolved.
Manstein returned to the Front with the freedom he needed
to execute his plans. To gain Hitler's timely support,
Manstein was forced to leave the front at a crucial time for
a day and a half. Yet the political victory of the conference
far outweighed the military benefits of his presence at the
Front. In dealing with his superior, Manstein was respectful,
logical and firm. He realized the importance of both
political and military battles in strategic planning.
C. MANSTEIN CASTLES TO THE LEFT
1. Risk
While Manstein had gained a freedom of action, it
would still take nearly two weeks to move Fourth Panzer Army
to the Left wing of Army Group Don. During that time the Axis
situation seemed to worsen as the Soviets pressed their
advantage. As Manstein positioned his forces for the
counterattack he had envisioned back in November, he ran a
considerable risk. If the Fourth Panzer Army was pulled out
of the line could the tired divisions of Army Detachment
Hollidt conduct an orderly retreat to the Mius and hold there?
138 Clark, Barbarossa , 260.
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When the 2nd SS Panzer Corps (under General Paul Hausser) was
pulled back, near Kharkov, would the remaining infantry be
able to retreat in an orderly fashion or would Soviet pressure
rout them? When the best elements of First Panzer Army were
shifted to the rear would the infantry be able to hold the
Donets river line near Lisichansk? His Panzer forces needed
as much rest as possible to achieve maximum success in the
counterattack. But how much rest was enough and how long
could the lines hold without panzer support? Manstein could
only rely on his instincts for the answers to these questions.
In the meantime Soviet pressure continued (See Figure 9).
2 . Growing Crisis
On 8 February, Vatutin struck south from his
bridgehead at Voroshilovgrad though that city had net been
fully cleared of Axis forces. Malinovsky attacked across the
lower Don, attempting to bypass Rostov and reach the Mius.
The pressure on Army Detachment Hollidt as it retreated toward
the Mius was tremendous. 1
On 9 February, Fortieth Army captured Belgorod,
opening the way to Kharkov. Volchansk fell to Sixty-Ninth
Army and Sixth Army took Andreyevka. Despite the best efforts
of the SS, a circle was forming around Kharkov. Between
Belgorod and Kursk, nearly 100 miles to the north, there were
I 3Q
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no effective Axis forces. The Soviets advanced through the
gap with all possible speed. 14°
On the middle Donets heavy fighting continued around
Slavyansk. Vatutin was unable to make any headway against
German defenses. STAVKA had been receiving reports of a
general retreat of Axis forces from the Donets basin. Stalin
decided Hitler would only give up that valuable coal region if
he was in dire straits. Based on reports of large troop
140 Ibid., 415.
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movements west (Fourth Panzer Army) it was decided the Axis
were attempting a complete withdrawal beyond the Dnieper
River. On 10 February Vatutin received new orders. Group
Popov was to release and bypass Slavyansk, moving south to
capture the rail junction near Grishino. This was the main
East -West line serving Army Group Don. First Guards Army was
to shift away from Slavyansk and race west, taking the Dnieper
crossings before the Axis could get across. Sixth Army was to
advance west toward Krasnograd with all possible speed. 141
During the night of 10 February Group Popov force
marched over terrain the Germans considered impassable. By
0900 11 February Popov surprised and defeated the meager Axis
forces defending near Grishino. This effectively severed that
primary rail line. 40th Panzer Corps (7th Panzer, 11th
Panzer, and SS Panzer Grenadier "Viking" divisions), which was
defending Slavyansk, moved to retake Grishino as soon as
possible. SS "Viking" Division moved to attack Grishino
directly while 7th and 11th Panzer divisions attempted to
isolate Popov while still defending Slavyansk. In four days
of heavy fighting the Germans were unable to dislodge Group
Popov. 142
On the night of 13 February, Third Guards Army managed
to filter the entire 7th Guards Cavalry Corps through Axis
141 Glantz, "From the Don to the Dnepr;' 149,
142 Ibid., 150-153.
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lines to capture the rail junction at Debaltsevo. This
severed the same rail line that moved through Grishino, only
seventy- five miles further east. To contain the cavalry, 17th
Panzer Division stayed in the area for several days at a time
when it should have been 100 miles west, "resting" with the
rest of Fourth Panzer Army.
On 14 February Fortieth Army fought into the suburbs
of Kharkov. A few miles to the south, Sixth Army took Zmiyev,
but could go no further north against determined SS defenders.
Instead, Sixth Army drove southwest toward Krasnograd as per
its new orders. Golikov's three armies were closing a ring
around Kharkov and the SS Panzer Corps defending it.
Hitler ordered 2nd SS Panzer Corps to hold Kharkov to
the last man. Manstein requested a withdrawal from Kharkov so
those forces might help secure his left flank. Hitler again
issued the order to hold, as did General Lanz, commander of
Army Detachment Lanz to which 2nd SS Panzer Corps was
officially subordinated. On 15 February, Hausser defied
orders and withdrew his Corps from Kharkov. General Lanz was
replaced by General Kempf. By withdrawing, 2nd SS Panzer
Corps became available for the counterattack later.
Additionally, STAVKA viewed the SS withdrawal from so
143 Clark, Barbarossa , 265. The Soviets surprised two
trains of Axis reinforcements for 17th Corps and put them
literally to the sword.
""* Manstein, Lost Victories , 418.
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important a city, rather than standing and fighting to the
end, as was Hitler's well-known practice, as further evidence
of an impending Axis collapse.
Kharkov fell to the Soviets on 16 February. Hitler
had had enough. He decided he would visit the Front himself
to assess Manstein's conpetence. Under Hitler's leadership,
rarely had a commander suffered such a string of defeats and
retained his command.
D. MEETING AT ZAPCRDZHE
The day after Kharkov fell, Army Group South (Army Group
Don was redesignated on 13 February) was warned to expect an
"immediate: visit from the Fuehrer. He arrived on 17 February
at Manstein's headquarters in Zaporozhe. That same day a
division from First Guards Army took Pavlograd, less than
forty miles from the Dnieper River. Except for the last days
of the war, this was the closest Hitler ever came to the
Front. While he was in Zaporozhe, Soviet cavalry elements
were reported along the Dnieper River. The day Hitler flew
back to Germany, Soviet tanks were seen within gun range of
the airfield. 146
145 Downing, The Devi 1 '
s
Virtuosos , 143. Hitler's fury
over this disobedience of the supposedly ultra- loyal SS
General Hausser was partly mollified by the immediate
strategic advantages gained. Nevertheless a head had to roll.
It was Lanz's.
146 Clark, Barbarossa, 266.
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Hitler arrived with an entourage of over 100, including
Zeitzler and Jodl . He was angry over the many unanswered
defeats Manstein had suffered. His mind was set to dismiss
Manstein, a common practice in the Third Reich. ^4 At this
critical time, Manstein was forced to defend against a
political threat to his entire operation. Hitler could easily
have hampered military operations, perhaps making success
impossible. With a knack for devising Grand Strategy (proven
by the early war years) and an uncanny mastery of tactical
details, Hitler was a formidable opponent in any military
argument. He used his numerous facts and figures to both
embarrass his adversary and impress any observers with his
'expertise'
.
After a brief situational report from Manstein, Hitler's
opening barrage was brisk. Allowed to retreat on 6 February,
Manstein had simply lost more land, including Kharkov. 148
Germans were falling back because only a third of their forces
was committed to the line. The front had lost all
cohesion. 14 Manstein received Hitler's attacks with cool
determination. He calmly presented the plan for his counter-
offensive. Hitler countered by insisting that Kharkov be
147 Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin , 91.
x^ Manstein, Lost Victories , 420. The defenders of
Kharkov were not placed under the command of Manstein until 13
February. Prior to that time Army Group B controlled all Axis
units in that sector, including the SS Panzer Corps.
149 Downing, The Devil's Virtuosos , 144.
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retaken as soon as possible with the SS Panzer Corps.
Manstein explained himself. It was not possible to attack
Kharkov and defend the Dnieper crossings simultaneously. If
the crossings fell, both the First Panzer Army and Army
Detachment Hollidt would be cut off, perhaps destroyed.
Postponing an attack on Kharkov threatened nothing. The
strength of the Fourth Panzer Army was better situated to
deliver immediate attacks near the Dnieper crossings. When
the spring thaw ended operations, it would do so in the area
around the Dnieper crossings before the area around
Kharkov. 15°
Hitler failed to see Manstein's logic. Finally, Manstein
pointed out that the decision on which way the SS Panzer Corps
should attack could be put off a few days. The Corps was
assembling near Krasnograd and would not be ready to attack
before 19 February. Only after three days of first-hand
observation was Hitler convinced of Manstein's plan.
This initial meeting at Zaporozhe revealed Manstein as a
man of complete self-control in the face of an irrational and
unschooled superior. Hitler certainly had a reputation of
ruining fine operations by micro-managing, sometimes down to
the battalion level. Both Summer campaigns on the Eastern
Front stood as prime examples of Hitler's tendency in this
regard. Manstein allowed the logic of his plan and the great
150 Manstein, Lost Victories. 424,
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success it premised to speak for themselves. When Hitler
remained unconvinced, he relied on events themselves to
enlighten the Fuehrer. If Manstein had aggressively
confronted Hitler on that first day, his plans would surely
have been ruined and perhaps he would have been relieved of
command. Manstein realized the importance of maintaining an
effective relationship with his political and military leader,
and planned accordingly.
On 18 February, Manstein allowed the latest reports from
the field to make an impression upon Hitler. The Soviet
cavalry corps remained intact at Debaltsevo. Group Popov
still held Grishino. Army Detachment Hollidt occupied
positions behind the Mius River, after retreating 100 miles in
nine days. The Soviets were right behind Hollidt. That night
3rd Guards Mechanized Corps pushed across the Mius River to
occupy a position 18 miles behind the Front. German forces
were able to isolate that unit and restore the line fairly
quickly. 151 Near Kharkov, SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf" had
become bogged down by a sudden thaw. Without "Totenkopf", an
immediate attack toward Kharkov was out of the question. If
the two divisions of 2nd SS Panzer Corps had been unable to
hold Kharkov, they certainly could not retake it without the
third's help. Manstein pointed to the need for an irtmediate
151 Ziemke, Stalingrad To Berlin
,
88. Only a sudden thaw
gave the Germans time to push the corps out and restore the
line before Soviet reinforcements could arrive.
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attack against Soviet forces near the Dnieper crossings, since
the thaw could be expected there soon. "' Finally, late in
the day, Soviet tanks were seen only 36 miles from
Zaporozhe. x Thoughts of relieving Manstein disappeared.
Hitler saw the logic of Manstein's plans or perhaps he
realized the urgent need for action, regardless of whose it
was. Whatever the reason, he issued orders for 2nd SS Panzer
Corps to attack southeast from Krasnograd as soon as
possible. 154
On 19 February, the conference continued. Kleist arrived
on short notice. Hitler used this day to reassert himself,
upset that events had proven him wrong. He informed Kleist
that his Army Group A would now be considered "an adjacent
reservoir of forces" for Army Group South. In eight days,
50,000 troops had been airlifted from the Taman Bridgehead and
100,000 by 6 March. However, these troops were without
weapons or equipment and arrived too late to be of any help
for Manstein's counter-offensive.
At one point, Hitler interrupted a brief to conduct a
personal attack on both Field Marshals. He accused both of
152 Manstein, Lost Victories . 425.
l ^i3J Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin . 91,
154 Manstein, Lost Victories , 426.
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recommending different actions when speaking privately, but
presenting a common front in public. He cited the controversy
over the First Panzer Army in December. The Field Marshals
were abruptly compelled to defend their actions in front of
all those present. Hitler stepped back and soon Manstein and
Kleist were angrily confronting each other. With an air of
superiority, Hitler ended it:
That's enough, gentlemen. You see how necessary it is for
me to be the one to decide. Please stop quarreling in
front of me now!
While Manstein was undoubtedly angry over the scene, such
psychological warfare was of little consequence to him. The
important thing was that Hitler leave Zaporozhe without
interfering in his plans for the counter-offensive. A report
of Soviet forces at Sinelnikovo, a mere 35 miles away, helped
Hitler regain his priorities and signaled the end of the
conference.
As Hitler's plane departed to the west, Manstein had
gained a great political victory. He successfully thwarted an
attempt by Hitler to interfere with and possibly ruin the plan
he had nurtured so carefully. He won by: first, carefully
marshalling a powerful and flawlessly logical argument;
second, maintaining self-control in the face of extreme
frustration; and finally, conceding the unimportant victories
157 Stahlberg, Bounden Duty . 279.
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in favor of the primary goal . Manstein emerged from the
conference free to execute his plan.
E. POISED
As mentioned earlier, Manstein had placed his army group
at tremendous risk by concentrating his Panzer forces, to the
maximum extent possible, in rear areas. His infantry, with
little Panzer support, retreated steadily. Yet as Manstein
had instinctively predicted, they maintained their cohesion
and did not break. Concentration was necessary to maximize
the effectiveness of his counterattack when it came. Another,
perhaps unanticpated benefit of this maneuvering was the
Soviet interpretation of a general rout.
The Soviets had eliminated several hundred thousand Axis
troops and large quantities of material since 19 November
1942. 15 Their Winter offensive had achieved undreamed of
successes. An air of over-confidence permeated STAVKA. After
all, it seemed only natural that the Axis powers were
weakening and retreating in early February 1943. The Soviet
military leadership watched the movement of men and material
behind the Axis lines, most of which were heading West, and
decided they were fleeing across the Dnieper River. Those few
forces moving East were labeled "covering forces" for the
Even though the overwhelming majority of those
casualties were Rumanian, Hungarian, or Italian rather than
German, the more lethal nationality.
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retreat. XJ With that in mind STAVKA pushed its armies
relentlessly forward to trap the "retreating" Axis. By 19
February Soviet armies were overextended, near exhaustion, but
convinced victory was just a few miles ahead. Manstein was
ready to spring his trap.
By 20 February the Panzer forces of Army Group South were
assembled in three groups. The 2nd SS Panzer Corps
("Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler", "Das Reich", "Totenkopf"
Divisions) was concentrated near Krasnograd. First Panzer
Army remained engaged with Group Popov, but was ready for
offensive operations near Grishino. It commanded 3rd Panzer
Corps (3rd, and 19th Panzer Divisions), and 40th Panzer Corps
(7th, and 11th Panzer Divisions and SS Panzer Grenadier
"Viking" Division). Fourth Panzer Army was fairly well rested
and concentrated fifty miles south of Pavlograd. It commanded
48th Panzer Corps (6th, and 17th Panzer Divisions), and 57th
Panzer Corps. As the Soviets continued to advance into
the 100 mile gap between these Panzer forces Manstein awaited
the right moment to strike.
159 Erickson, The Road to Berlin , 50.
160 See Glantz, "From the Don to the Dnepr" 158-160;
Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, 94; Seaton, The Russo-German War
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, 348. 19th Panzer Division was badly mauled from the
fighting near Chertkovo and played only a minor role. It is
unclear whether 16th Motorized, 23rd Panzer, and 27th Panzer
Divisions were still under Army Group South. Fourth Panzer
Army totaled three Panzer and two "other" Divisions. One or
two of the above mentioned formations probably participated
but there is no mention of them in these accounts.
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Few commanders in World War Two would have considered the
plan Manstein chose under such dangerous circumstances. That
he began taking the operational risks necessary for its
success a full three months earlier is extraordinary.
Manstein understood what his troops were capable of. He
sensed the Soviet capabilities, anticipating their sustained
offensive and their diminishing effectiveness. He established
a successful rapport with Hitler, winning the political
battle. From his numerous, and often conflicting,
intelligence sources he discerned the truth, regarding Soviet
endurance. In Manstein' s situation most commanders would have
succumb to hopelessness and viewed retreat as their only
viable option. Uniquely, in this danger, Manstein saw an
opportunity to strike back rather than the more orthodox
flight from encirclement. Three months after its inception
his counterattack was ready to take advantage of that
opportunity.
F. "CLIMATE OP WAR"
Between 29 January and 19 February, 1943, the danger
peaked for the German Southern wing on the East Front. The
fact that Manstein had a plan and was maneuvering his units
with a purpose made the danger no less. Along his entire 800
mile line, infantry divisions were tasked to hold extended
sectors with little or no Panzer support. Soviet pressure
continued to grow. STAVKA still enjoyed a significant
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numerical superiority at every point of attack. German
infantry divisions were frequently subjected to local
encirclement as Soviet units bypassed them on the vast
steppes. Most successfully regained Axis lines against great
odds. Soviet penetrations often severed vital supply lines
(Debaltsevo, Grishino, and Sinelnikovo) , further limiting the
German infantry's resources at the front. Manstein faced the
very real danger that his front line infantry might break at
any moment.
The Panzer forces faced the same danger as the infantry
when they were on the line. They also faced a more strategic
threat. If the counterattack was to succeed, the Panzer
forces needed rest. With every critical development at the
front the Panzer forces were drawn toward the fighting. This
happened at Grishino, Slavyansk, Debaltsevo, and Kharkov.
Manstein had to balance his priorities between stability at
the front and the prospect of strategic success in the planned
counterattack.
Even if Axis forces held together tactically, their
remained a strategic danger of encirclement for the entire
Army Group South including the bridgehead at Taman. By 19
February Soviet units were along the Dnieper River and within
striking distance of the crossings at Dnepropetrovsk and
Zaporozhe, lightly defended at the time. If the Soviets had
taken those crossings with any significant force, the only
supply lines for three German armies would have been cut far
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in their rear (Army Detachment Hollidt, Seventeenth, and First
Panzer). Any fight for the crossings would have heavily
engaged Fourth Panzer Army and made the counterattack much
less effective or impossible. The war for Germany might have
ended at the Dnieper crossings in late February, 1943.
Manstein continued to operate in an atmosphere of great
danger
.
The effects of exertion increased for both sides during
this time. The Soviet armies had been conducting offensive
operations with little pause for almost three months,
reclaiming thousands of square miles of territory from the
Axis. Their continued numerical superiority allowed them to
rest some units and still maintain pressure on the Axis. Yet
as STAVKA's orders became more ambitious, Army commanders soon
found all their formations committed forward. Fatigue could
also be diminished by victory, and the Soviets could point to
many since 19 November, 1942.
The adverse effects of exertion had reached their apex for
the Axis by 19 February. Literally every infantry division in
Army Group South had been engaged in heavy defensive battles
for three months. They could claim no victories and had
steadily given ground to the Soviets. They were near
exhaustion. Manstein planned on little if any infantry
support for his counterattack.
The Panzer forces continued to act as "fire brigades",
rushing to contain the most dangerous Soviet penetrations. In
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this way, several divisions (16th Motorized, 19th Panzer, 23rd
Panzer, and 27 th Panzer) were so badly weakened that they
could play little, if any, role in the proposed counterattack.
Some divisions (3rd Panzer, 7th Panzer, 11th Panzer, and SS
"Viking") had to transition from defensive operations to the
counterattack without a pause. Manstein had to consider the
effect of exertion on his troops as he chose the timing and
goals of his counterattack.
Uncertainty continued to make itself felt on the
battlefield. North and south of Kharkov large gaps in the
Front existed where no viable Axis forces operated. In these
areas Soviet movements went un-monitored for days, except for
aerial observation. Terrain the Germans considered impassable
often provided safe passage for the Soviets when bypassing
Axis formations. Soviet units literally popped up out of
nowhere on an Axis flank or in the rear. This happened at
Debaltsevo, Grishino, and near the Dnieper crossings. By mid-
February there was a possibility the armies which were
previously engaged around Stalingrad, might make a
contribution to the fighting against Army Group South.
Manstein had to trust in his troops to handle these surprises
and not be distracted from planning his main counterattack.
The personality of Hitler became a primary source of
uncertainty for Manstein during this time. The two lengthy
face to face meetings with Hitler attest to the fact Manstein
was unable to predict how Hitler would decide an issue. He
99
was never sure what information Hitler used to arrive at
decisions, if any. Manstein was fighting two wars: the one
with the Soviets was often less dangerous to the survival of
Army Group South than the one with Hitler. Plans had to be
revised constantly as Hitler ordered this or that piece of
land held by this or that specific unit. The argument over
the retreat to the Mius and the defense of Kharkov serve as
examples of such micro-management. Manstein realized the
importance of an effective relationship with Hitler and set
his priorities accordingly.
The survival of Army Group South during this time
continued to depend upon chance events. Why did the normally
paranoid Stalin chose to interpret intelligence reports of
Axis troop movements as indicative of a general retreat? He
drove his forces forward to exhaustion. Stalin might have
been more conservative, less ambitious and still ended "that
winter" with a string of victories. His mistake played into
Manstein' s hands.
General Hausser's decision to defy orders and abandon
Kharkov rather than be encircled there was certainly chance.
His unit, 2nd SS Panzer Corps, formed the most powerful
element of Manstein' s strike force. Without its
participation, the counterattack would have achieved much less
or even have failed.
The weather remained a primary element of chance. Snow,
accompanied by very low temperatures, covered the battlefield.
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A sudden thaw around 19 February accomplished two things.
Army Group Hollidt was able to crush the Mechanized Corps
which had penetrated the Mius defensive positions before
Soviet reinforcements could be brought up. Also, near
Kharkov, SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf" was immobilized by the
thaw. Its condition provided strength for the argument
Manstein presented to Hitler, regarding the sequence of
Manstein's attack. Between 29 January and 19 February, chance






STAVKA remained convinced the Axis were in full
retreat. Soviet Front commanders shared the same uninformed
view. As late as 20 February, its' Front commanders told
STAVKA that large enemy columns were retiring west from the
Donets Basin across the Dnieper River. Commanders closer to
the front, like Popov, and Kuznetsov, knew the Germans were
not in flight, but their arguments ignored by Vatutin, never
reached Stalin. Orders of 20 February were for the 6th and
1st Guard Armies to advance west with all possible speed.
On 20 February, the Luftwaffe intercepted radio
transmissions from lead Soviet elements and Group Popov,
saying they had not received any supplies for some time. The
Soviet armored force near Zaporozhe had run out of fuel 12
miles short of the city. 162 Manstein realized the Soviets,
161 Erickson, Road To Berlin . 50. On 19 and 20 February,
Soviet aerial reconnaissance noted the concentrations of 2nd
SS Panzer Corps and Fourth Panzer Army. At 1600 20 February,
Vatutin' s Chief of Staff, General S. P. Ivanov signed an
operational appreciation affirming the armored concentrations
as proof positive of continued withdrawal in the sector.
162 Manstein, Lost Victories . 431.
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after three months of offensive operations, had reached their
limit and were vulnerable.
His plan called for First Panzer Army to destroy Group
Popov as soon as possible and advance north from Grishino to
the Donets River. It was to secure the southern bank between
Slavyansk and Andreyevka, preventing a Soviet retreat across
the river. Fourth Panzer Army and 2nd SS Panzer Corps would
cooperate in a concentric attack directed toward the area
around Pavlograd. Fourth Panzer Army was to strike north,
from its assembly area east of Zaporozhe, with 48th Panzer
Corps leading. From the vicinity of Krasnograd, 2nd SS Panzer
Corps was to strike southeast. The operation would emphasize
the destruction of Soviet forces rather than the acquisition
of territory. This was due in part to Manstein's disdain for
holding territory and his general scarcity of infantry,
necessary for holding that territory (See Figure 10).
2 . Execution
On the morning of 20 February, SS Panzer Division "Das
Reich" struck suddenly from assembly areas south of
Krasnograd. Weakened and overextended, Soviet units were
easily brushed aside as the SS Panzer Corps pushed south,
taking Novo Moskovsk that day. SS "Das Reich", assisted by
15th Infantry Division, moved directly on Pavlograd while SS
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Figure 10 Phase One Manstein's Counterattack 19 FEB - 5 MAR
1943
Panzer Division "Totenkopf" circled to the north of the
163
city. XOJ On 23 February, Fourth Panzer Army opened its
offensive. 48th Panzer Corps joined hands with the SS near
Pavlograd on 24 February and prepared to renew their advance
toward the northeast the next morning. Also on 24 February,
Group Popov forced out of Grishino, reported retreating north
163 Downing , The Devil's Virtuosos
,
144, The 15th
Infantry Division had been on the Atlantic coast ten days
earlier. Trains carried it literally to the Front. Soviet
troops fighting for Sinelnikovo were surprised to see
regiments of the 15th jumping off cars at the city station in
the early hours of 20 February.
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in disarray toward Barvenkovo. It was under heavy attack from
40th Panzer Corps. 164
For Manstein, things were improving everywhere. On 21
February reports reached him of the surrender of the Soviet
Cavalry at Debaltsevo and the destruction of 3rd Guards
Mechanized Corps, which had penetrated the Mius line. STAVKA
remained apparently ignorant of developments at the Front. * 65
Vatutin continued issuing orders calling for rapid
advances west. His only adjustments were to speed-up the
transfer of units from neighboring armies. Several divisions
were ordered to shift from the front's left flank to the
right. Stubbornly, Vatutin refused to place his Front on the
defensive. Individual Soviet formations randomly chose to
switch over to the defensive as they identified Axis units in
their rear. But without coordination from the Front they were
unable to offer effective resistance. Some Soviet divisions,
finding themselves cut off, abandoned their equipment and fled
northeast toward the Donets.
On 21 February, Golikov, acting apparently on his own
initiative, directed his Sixty-ninth and Third Tank Armies to
shift their advance south toward Krasnograd. They were to
assist Sixth Army against the reported Axis activity in their
164 See Glantz, "From the Don to the Dnepr," 166-171;
Erickson, The Road to Berlin , 53.
165 Manstein, Lost Victories , 431.
166 Glantz, "From the Don to the Dnepr" 170-171.
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sector. On 23 February, after encountering stiff resistance
from Motorized Division "Grossdeutschland", Golikov ordered
both Armies to resume their westerly advance. 16
Having isolated a large portion of Sixth Army and
severely damaged Group Popov and First Guards Army, Manstein
moved to capitalize on his momentum and finish them off. On
25 February, SS "Das Reich" and SS "Totenkopf" struck north
from Pavlograd. They were joined on their right by 48th
Panzer Corps. The remnants of Group Popov were making a stand
near Barvenkovo and 40th Panzer Corps moved north to crush
them. 168
After five days of punishment from the Panzers,
Vatutin finally recognized the danger. On 25 February he
ordered Southwest Front onto the defensive in all sectors. He
submitted, for the first time, a report to STAVKA revealing
his desperate state of affairs. He included with it a request
for every available reinforcement. Meanwhile, the Panzers
rolled on. 169
On 27 February, the SS cleared Lozovaya and 40th
Panzer Corps was authorized to bypass Barvenkovo. STAVKA
issued its first orders concerning the attack, a week after
the fact. All remaining elements of Sixth and First Guards
167 Erickson, The Road to Berlin . 52.
168 Glantz, "From the Don to the Dnepr," 174-177
1 69' Erickson, The Road to Berlin, 53.
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Armies were to withdraw across the Donets River as soon as
possible. To cover the retreat, Golikov was to send his Third
Tank Army south against the Axis flank. Rybalko had for days
been fighting SS Panzer Division "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler"
and was at minimal strength. The attack south, into the
strength of 2nd SS Panzer Corps, promised nothing but suicide
for Third Tank Army. 170
On 28 February, 3rd Panzer Corps joined the offensive
by capturing Slavyansk. It then turned east in an effort to
drive all Soviet forces between Slavyansk and Voroshilovgrad,
north of the Donets. Manstein was surprised by the
success of his counterattack to date. He discerned a very
real possibility of retaking Kharkov before the Spring thaw.
Orders went out for 2nd SS, and 48th Panzer Corps to advance
north toward Kharkov. Despite several days of above freezing
temperatures with the associated muddy conditions in the area
and the resistance of Third Tank Army, both Corps were within
striking distance of Kharkov by 5 March. * 2
Also by 5 March, there were no viable Soviet forces
south of the Donets between Zmiyev and Voroshilovgrad. Phase
one of Manstein' s counterattack was an undreamed of success.
He paused to assess the situation. Soviet Sixth, and First
170 Glantz, "From the Don to the Dnepr" 177-178
171 Ibid., 179.
1 7?"'* Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin , 96.
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Guards Armies existed in name only. While many of their
soldiers made it across the Donets, almost all the heavy
equipment was left on the southern bank. Third Tank Army
literally splintered under the impact of 2nd SS Panzer Corps
and was no longer capable of offensive action. Manstein's
troops estimated Soviet losses at 35,000 killed, 676 tanks
captured or destroyed, along with 579 field pieces, 600 motor
vehicles and large numbers of machine guns and mortars. Very
few Soviets were captured, only about 9,000, as they were able
to slip by the concentrated Panzer forces and escape
northeast. Axis losses were light by comparison.
Manstein now set his sights on Kharkov.
B. PHASE TWO
1 . Background
While Manstein chopped up Southwest Front, Golikov
continued his advance west toward Kiev. By 5 March, the bulk
of both Sixty-ninth and Fortieth Armies was fifty to seventy-
five miles west of Kharkov. With the sudden collapse of Third
Tank Army, both Armies and Kharkov had become vulnerable.
Manstein moved his forces into place and was ready to
strike for Kharkov on 6 March. 2nd SS Panzer Corps, with its
three excellent divisions, would spearhead the operation,
striking from south of the city. It was supported on the
173 Manstein, Lost Victories , 433-434. This figure
includes the loses of 3rd Tank Army in its attack south.
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right by 48th Panzer Corps (reorganized to include 6th and
11th Panzer Divisions). Army Detachment Kempf would press the
Soviet Armies from the west with its Provisional Corps Raus
(167th, 168th, and 320th Infantry Divisions, and Motorized
Division "Grossdeutschl and" ) . 174
The weather was fast becoming a factor. Recent thaws
had turned the streams near Kharkov into formidable obstacles.
Mud could stop the Panzers at any moment. After careful
consideration of the weather Manstein adjusted his attack.
Rather than circling to the east of the city, as was the
custom in such an operation, he would send his Panzer forces
west and north of Kharkov, in a clockwise arc. In this way,
they would not be trapped east of the city by a sudden change
in the weather. On 7 March, the weather turned colder again
and Manstein gave the go ahead for phase two of his
counterattack (See Figure 11). 175
2 . Execution
SS "Das Reich" and SS "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler"
advanced toward Valki on 6 March, joined the next day by SS
"Totenkopf" which had mopped up Third Tank Army. That day,
48th Panzer Corps entered a two day fight for Taranovka
174 See Glantz, "From the Dan to The Dnepr", 272;
Department of the Army, German Defense Tactics Against Russian
Break-Throughs . Pamphlet No. 20-233, (Washington D. C.
:
Government Printing Office, 1951), 3-8.
See Downing, The Devil's Virtuosos , 146; Glantz,













Figure 11 Phase Two Manstein's Counterattack 6-18 MAR 1943
against stiff Soviet resistance. Golikov's southern flank was
i n c
nearing col 1 apse . x '
°
Valki fell to the SS on 7 March. Hausser turned next
toward Lyubotin. That day Provisional Corps Raus moved over
to offensive operations, sending "Grossdeutschl and" Division
176 Glantz, "From the Dan to the Dnepr" 273.
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aggressively into the gap between Sixty-ninth Army and the
remnants of Third Tank Army. Manstein hoped to separate
Sixty-ninth and Fortieth Armies from the defenders of Kharkov.
Soviet command, down to Army level, again proved unable to
coordinate any effective resistance. 177
By 1600 on 8 March, Lyubotin was surrounded. That
city fell on 9 March. Hausser turned northeast, continuing to
split the Soviet Armies from Kharkov. South of Kharkov, along
the Mzha River, 48th Panzer Corps continued to engage several
Soviet units as it protected the SS flank. Fresh divisions
from STAVKA reserves began arriving to block the approaches to
Kharkov. 178
On 10 March, three divisions from Fortieth Army
launched a fruitless attack from Bogodukhov, attempting to
reestablish comrnunications with Third Tank Army.
"Grossdeutschland" Division handled the attack without
breaking stride. 2nd SS Panzer Corps was swirling west and
north of Kharkov, with some elements entering the suburbs.
Manstein reminded Hausser that he was to avoid an entangling
house to house fight for the city. STAVKA ordered three fresh




179 Ibid., 278-279. These formations were First Tank,
Twenty-first, and Sixty-fourth Armies.
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"Grossdeutschl and" took Bogodukhov on 11 March. One
Corps from German Second Army, with Army Group Center, struck
the north flank of Fortieth Army. Hausser again defied orders
and sent two divisions into Kharkov. SS "Totenkopf" continued
circling the city to the north. xo
On 13 March, the Soviet situation worsened. SS
"Totenkopf" took Rogan, astride the main canrmunications line
for the defenders of Kharkov. Third Tank Army was effectively
cut off in the city. "Grossdeutschl and" Division drove a
wedge between Sixty-ninth and Fortieth Armies. All three
Soviet Armies in the Kharkov sector were isolated and fighting
for their survival . A Corps from Second Army teamed up with
Provisional Corps Raus to dissect Fortieth Army. Third Tank
Army was disintegrating under pressure from 2nd SS Panzer
Corps. Sixty-ninth Army was falling back toward Belgorod,
pursued by "Grossdeutschl and" Division.
On 15 March Rybalko was given permission to withdraw
what remained of his Army from Kharkov. Several fresh Soviet
divisions were moving into blocking positions between Kharkov
and the Donets. STAVKA wanted to retain a bridgehead on the
west bank of the river. Heavy fighting developed in this area
as 2nd SS, and 48th Panzer Corps, reinforced by a few Infantry




Not until 26 March were all Soviet forces cleared from the
west bank of the northern Donets. 182
On the morning of 18 March, 2nd SS Panzer Corps and
"Grossdeutschland" Division moved against Sixty-ninth Army
near Belgorod. Kazakov had no tanks, less than 100 guns and
his divisions were ground down to less than 1,000 men
each. 183 By 1900 that day, Axis forces controlled the city.
Kazakov pulled his Army back across the Donets, to be joined
there by the three Armies STAVKA was assembling in the
area.
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With the fall of Belgorod, Manstein declared the
operation complete. On 23 March, the Spring thaw set in,
ending operations in the area. Army Group South stood along
approximately the same line it held at the start of the 1942
Summer offensive.
The Soviet Winter Offensive of 1942-43 came very close
to annihilating the southern wing of the Axis on the East
Front. The most powerful German Army in the theater (Sixth)
was destroyed along with four Axis allied Armies (Third
Rumanian, Fourth Rumanian, Second Hungarian, and Eighth
Italian). The Axis lost hundreds of thousands of troops,
great quantities of equipment, and thousands of square miles
182 Ibid., 283-285.
183 Erickson, The Road To Berlin , 54.
184 Glantz, "From the Don to the Dnepr;' 286,
113
of territory. In the final weeks of February, STAVKA believed
itself within a few miles of total victory. At that moment
Manstein seized the initiative and surprised the Soviets with
his devastating counterattack. When the Spring thaws ended
operations, the pride of six Soviet Armies lay in shambles
between the Dnieper and Donets Rivers (Fortieth, Sixty-ninth,
Third Tank, Sixth, First Guards, and Group Popov). Manstein
regained several thousand square miles of territory. He
startled Soviet planners and perhaps caused their passive
strategy that Spring. He also rejuvenated Axis hopes, a good
thing in the short term but bad if it contributed to Hitler's
offensive folly in a potential future battle.
C. "CLIMATE OF WAR"
Danger for Manstein diminished considerably after he
seized the initiative with his counterattack. The Soviets,
however, were forced to confront the danger of losing several
Armies by the unexpected Axis move. After three months of
successful offensive operations the sudden change affected
every level of Soviet command. This is seen in the actions of
individual units as they fled toward the Donets. Front
commander Golikov, attacked south briefly in the opening days
of the counterattack uncharacteristically on his own
initiative. Vatutin failed to respond to the counterattack
for several days and did not even report it to STAVKA for five
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days. STAVKA's behavior in Spring 1943 has been attributed to
the fear invoked by Manstein's counterattack. ^
For the soldiers of Army Group South, the battlefield
remained a dangerous place whether attacking or defending. At
the Divisional and Corps level, the Group was much safer
during the counterattack than before it. The Germans were
able to choose the time, place, and circumstances for engaging
the enemy. The danger of encirclement from Soviet action was
less than it had been since 19 November, 1942. There was a
threat of destruction if individual units advanced too far
beyond their neighbors, leaving their flanks unguarded, but
evem that lessened. In the type of mobile operation Mastein
conducted, the Soviets reacted too slowly on the defensive to
mount damaging counterattacks
.
The effects of exertion remained constant with respect to
there sources during the counterattack. Every formation of
Army Group South stayed on the line, engaged in heavy combat
throughout the period. Only Fourth Panzer Army had any rest
since 19 November, and that was minimal. The overall effects
of exertion on the battlefield were changed fundamentally.
For the first time that winter, the Axis enjoyed victory. A
victorious Army tends to feel the effects of exertion to a
lesser degree than its defeated opponent. As the Panzers
exerted pressure on Vatutin and Golikov, Soviet pressure on
185 Clark, Barbarossa . 271.
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other sectors of the Front diminished. Besides the two
battles of containment near Debaltsevo and behind the Mius,
Army Detachment Hollidt enjoyed a reduced operational tempo
during the counterattack
.
Once again Manstein sensed what was possible with his
strike forces. The decision to move west of Kharkov rather
than east was in part due to his instinctive understanding of
the affects of exertion on his troops. A sudden thaw might
have trapped his tired forces in a muddy quagmire east of the
city. That same understanding, regarding Soviet troops,
helped Manstein choose the timing of his counterattack.
Nearing the point of exhaustion, the Soviet formations proved
unable to maintain their cohesion west of the Donets.
For Manstein a major source of uncertainty during his
counterattack was the reaction of STAVKA. He knew the units
he faced and their strength. He knew the terrain and how fast
his Panzers could cover it. He had no idea how fast STAVKA
would respond to his moves. The seven Armies from Stalingrad
might have made themselves felt between the Donets and Dnieper
in early March. STAVKA might have interpreted the reports it
received concerning Axis troop movements more conservatively,
as had been its habit throughout most of the war. The fact
that STAVKA failed to react to the counterattack for a full
week and that Vatutin did not report it for five days could
not have been anticipated, even by Manstein. His
counterattack would have achieved far less if Vatutin and
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Golikov had placed their Fronts in a defensive posture on its
first day. Instead they continued pushing their Armies
further into the Axis trap. Manstein did not allow worries
over the Soviet response to distract him. He assembled the
most powerful strike force he could under the circumstances.
He set reasonable objectives and chose a seemingly appropriate
time to attack, all based on the best information at his
disposal. He considered the Soviet responses, but opted not
to devise intricate plans for every possibility, as the
British had attempted so disasterously at the Battle of the
Somrne in 1916. XOD He relied on the superior initiative of
the German formations to adjust on the battlefield and meet
changing circumstances. Manstein was surprised at the success
of his counterattack but to a lesser degree probably than
everyone else.
Chance remained a decisive element during the
counterattack. Soviet behavior prior to and during the
counterattack could easily have been more conservative. The
Soviet offensive in the Winter of 1942-43 marked the last time
186 The British devised a meticulously detailed plan for
victory in this battle. They realized confusion impaired
effectiveness on the battlefield but failed to choose the
right answer. Their plan, once initiated, was not to be
changed for any reason. The Germans were able exploit several
flaws in the British plan. With relatively few loses, the
Germans killed 56,000 British on just the first day of the
attack.
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STAVKA behaved so recklessly toward German military might. 187
If it had chosen less ambitious goals that winter things would
have been different. It might have gained less territory but
when Manstein counterattacked its troops would have been
better rested and perhaps have stopped him short of success.
The weather continued to dictate the course of operations
in the area. As brief thaws moved through the area units were
randomly immobilized, or saved from sudden assault by deep
mud. Manstein chose his path to Kharkov based on the prospect
of a sudden thaw trapping his Panzers well forward without
infantry support. If the Donets had remained frozen solid,
Soviet losses in heavy equipment might have been less in the
retreat. It is unlikely the Germans would have crossed the
Donets in force behind them since the spring ice floes usually
destroyed all but the strongest bridges. If the thaw had come
early that winter Manstein may have been unable to launch his
attack at all.
The "climate of war" as defined by Clausewitz, remained
valid for Manstein nearly a century later. Manstein also
posessed those qualities indicative of a military genius as
set forth by Clausewitz. He operated successfully in an
atmosphere of danger, exertion, uncertainty and chance. An
187 Soviet operational experience in 1941 demonstrated
the danger of setting overly ambitious goals. This at the
cost of millions of troops. They remained generally paranoid
of German offensive capabilities throughout the war. The
Soviets eventually won the war by conservative application of
overwhelming numerical superiority.
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instinctive grasp of the basic principles of war helped him
achieve his goals in the face of that "climate".
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VII. GENIUS AT WORK
A. "CLIMATE OF WAR"
Faced with so severe a "climate of war", how did Manstein
achieve such success? The enemy is not the only thing that
can defeat an army on the battlefield. The "climate"
threatens to paralyse the will of every commander in war. The
danger he is subjected to increases the stress he feels over
every decision. Exertion weakens the mind and body, making
the commander less able to deal with the stress and to think
clearly. Uncertainty weakens the confidence he needs to make
the difficult decisions. Chance looms over all, frustrating
the commander and threatening to undue his best efforts at any
moment. Confronted by these elements, the human actor tends
not to take action and to allow himself to be buffeted around
by events. By inaction he may feel that he reduces the weight
of the responsibility that he shoulders for success or
failure. Action in war carries with it an immense
responsibility for the outcome of that decision and act. It
takes a special commander to avoid paralysis of the will on
the battlefield and through decisive action to achieve
victory.
Manstein demonstrated an uncanny ability to prioritize his
goals in battle. He dealt with the "climate of war" in
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similar fashion. Of the four elements, danger, exertion,
uncertainty, and chance, he chose to focus on uncertainty.
After three years of war, Manstein was as comfortable as
anyone with danger. To ccmbat exertion, he relied on his good
health and physical condition, his military training and
adrenaline. He realized he could do little to eliminate
chance events in battle. Even his best efforts could only
reduce, not eliminate that element. He affected mission style
orders rather than detailed directions to combat chance
showing confidence in his subordinates to deal decisively with
chance within the framework of the overall mission. Manstein
directed his energies toward the fourth and final element
uncertainty — and in this way brought the "climate of war"
under the greatest possible control.
To defeat uncertainty, Manstein used those qualities of
"genius" so clearly defined by Clausewitz. Throughout the
campaign, he sensed what was possible for the Soviets and his
own troops as well. He trusted his own judgement and
training. A "sixth sense" if you will, enabled him to sift
through the avalanche of information reaching him and discern
the "truth". He made his appraisals, not sitting at a
comfortable desk far from combat, but in close proximity to
the battlefield. Each decision was encompassed by a
particularly severe "climate of war". That he performed so
well under such conditions is extraordinary.
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B. GERMAN GENERAL STAFF
Manstein credits much of his success during the Winter of
1942-43 to those leadership qualities that permeated the
German Army and were the product of the school of the German
General Staff. First, every commander knew the value of
conducting operations elastically and resourcefully. The
German commander was not afraid to change with a situation.
Second, at all levels, commanders were given every possible
opportunity to use their initiative and to be self-sufficient.
Micro-management of subordinate commanders was consciously
kept to a minimum. Manstein believed off-the-record "advice"
to subordinates killed initiative and hid responsibility. He
and his Staff refrained from being too specific with orders to
subordinates, leaving tactical execution to their discretion.
The General Staff provided a forum where new military
ideas surfaced and were considered. It also developed the
axioms which governed the way German commanders thought
concerning the battlefield. Trevor Dupuy credits the German
General Staff with having "institutionalized military
excellence". 188 The General Staff operated on along certain
lines which set it apart from other nations and their armies.
First, promotions were dependent upon rigorous examination.
This filtered all but the best minds and insured professional
Trevor N. Dupuy, Colonel, USA, Ret., A Genius for
War: The German Army and General Staff, 1807-1945 (Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1977), 302.
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prowess of senior officers. Second, the single most important
aspect of military performance was the ability to exercise
individual initiative. All training was geared toward
identifying, or instilling this quality in every German
officer. Third, great importance was placed on a ccmranders
ability to accept responsibility, both for his initiative and
for his comrades on the battlefield. There was a realization
that every soldier or officer was, to some extent his
brother's keeper. Finally, the General Staff guided every
level of training. This insured standardization throughout
the German Army. Uniquely, the German General Staff
deliberately and systematically sought to combine the
soldierly qualities of discipline, devotion to duty, and
gallantry, found to some degree in every army, with
individuality, a trait considered undesirable in most armies.
The results of the German General Staff can be seen in
battles. The 48th Panzer Corps along the Chir in December
1942, and the 11th Panzer Division at Manutchskaya in late
January 1943, are two examples which demonstrate the success
of the General Staff system. For Manstein, the trust in
himself and his subordinates that grew from three years of
successful combat, combined with the teachings of the General
Staff to give him a certain confidence in the face of
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uncertainty. By mastering uncertainty he reduced the "climate
of war" to a level in which he could operate effectively. ^89
C. LEADERSHIP
One important reason for Manstein's success "that Winter"
was his style of leadership. He understood how to induce his
subordinates to risk their lives bravely in battle. S. L. A.
Marshall tells what is needed in the following:
He [the soldier] will be persuaded largely by the same
things which induce him to face life bravely
friendship, loyalty to responsibility, and knowledge that
he is a repository of the faith and confidence of
others. 19°
Manstein used every opportunity to build a rapport with his
subordinates. Whenever possible he conveyed his orders
personally. In this manner he was able gain a more accurate
picture of the circumstances faced by his subordinates and the
support they might need for success. Twice Manstein proposed
to fly into the Stalingrad pocket to speak directly with
Paul us. He was dissuaded from the hazardous attempt by his
Staff, but only after comparable substitutes were
"volunteered" to go in his place. The two most important
decisions regarding his counterattack were made after long
face to face meetings with Hitler. The first was allowing the
retreat to the Mius and the second the giving the go ahead for
189 Manstein, Lost Victories , 382-383
190 Marshall, Men Against Fire , 161.
124
the counterattack. Manstein realized personal contact with
Hitler was the only way to get a timely decision from him,
particularly after the disaster at Stalingrad.
In the three years of fighting prior to the Winter of
1942-43 Manstein had distinguished himself in the planning for
the French campaign, the initial drive on Leningrad and the
siege of Sevastopol . The troops of Army Group Don knew they
were led by the best in the business. During his trial, after
the war, Manstein was tried on 17 counts of crimes against
humanity by the Allies, he was convicted of only one minor,
largely symbolic charge. Deliberations brought out numerous
incidents where he acted publicly on behalf of Soviet
prisoners. x x Such moral integrity and so successful a
record, helped build a reputation worthy of respect on and off
the battlefield.
D. PRINCIPLES OF WAR
For success "that winter" Manstein relied on an
instinctive mastery of the three basic Principles of War --
Initiative, Surprise, and Concentration of Effort. While
these bear similar names to those on the U.S. Army's list of
accepted Principles of War, there are important differences.
The U.S. Army's list is a lengthy ten to fifteen entries. It
was written by commanders and academicians in comfortable
191 R. T. Paget, Manstein, His Campaigns and His Trial
(London: Collins, 1951) all.
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offices, during time of peace. It is to be studied as one
might study any other required class. The "climate of war"
exerts little influence in the classrooms where soldiers study
the principles of war.
Manstein was operationally oriented. He may have studied
the accepted principles of war for his day, but in the heat of
battle it is doubtful he ever gave them a conscious thought.
Manstein, like Napoleon and Alexander the Great before him,
simply did what he believed would bring success on the
battlefield. The labels used to describe the actions of these
great commanders in battle are chosen after the fact by their
students. These become the "principles" with which we are so
familiar. To execute these "principles" on the field of
battle is quite different from knowing them for a final exam
in school
.
Manstein knew the value of Initiative. He gained the
initiative slowly during the campaign while conducting an
orderly retreat. Each movement was designed eventually to
free up forces capable of launching a decisive attack. He was
well served by extremely capable subordinates who also
understood the value of initiative at their tactical level
.
By skillful maneuver strategically, and the expertise of his
subordinate commanders tactically, Manstein was able to
exhaust the Soviets. By February, he was in a position to act
decisively and he seized the initiative along the entire
southern wing of the East Front. From the first seconds of
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the counterattack, the Soviets could do little more than
react. Manstein was free to dictate the course of the battle
until the Spring thaws.
Manstein understood the role of Surprise in battle. He
used surprise to multiply the power of his strike forces.
Manstein achieved surprise by assembling his forces for attack
well beyond The Soviet advance. 2nd SS Panzer Corps and
Fourth Panzer Army gathered ahead of the Soviets and
essentially waited for them to advance into the trap. Helpful
in encouraging a dangerous continuation of the Soviet advance
was the STAVKA which refused to believe what its people at the
Front were telling it. Several intercepted radio messages
from Soviet units helped Manstein choose his time to strike.
Hitler's policy of no retreat, demonstrated during the winter
of 1941-42 and again with the 6th Army helped to lull the
Soviets into a false sense of security. They noted German
units seemingly giving ground in several important places, and
believed Hitler would stand and fight if he possibly could.
This logic was instrumental in the STAVKA' s orders for
continued advances. Misinterpretations by STAVKA, skillful
long-term planning enabled him to achieve total strategic
surprise with his counterattack.
Manstein was not one to fall between two stools. Once he
decided upon a correct course of action, he committed himself
totally to it. This philosophy of bold concentration of
effort, was the foundation of the German "Blitzkrieg". By the
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Winter of 1942-43, Manstein was accustomed to such commitment.
Given the vast distances on the East Front and numerical
inferiority of the Axis, success often depended on applying
decisively concentrated firepower at the right point and time.
The U.S. Army calls such decisions the Principle of
Concentration of Effort.
Manstein assembled every available Panzer division into
five Panzer Corps. Two Soviet Armies were between them. From
different points of the compass, his Corps would move on the
Soviet Armies, crushing them in the process. When the attack
began Manstein kept the Corps in armored fists, not worrying
about his flanks. A few German infantry divisions could mop
up on the flanks after the fact. This is why so few Soviets
were captured, but most escaped with little more than the
shirts on their backs. Manstein mentions concentric attacks
by these Corps. The 2nd SS and 48th Panzer Corps, for
example, converged on the same point — Pavlograd — in the
middle of the Soviet First Guards and Sixth Armies.
Throughout the counterattack, German Panzer Corps converged on
their objectives. They sequentially reached Pavlograd, the
Donets, and Kharkov. In this manner the success of one Corps
assisted each of the other Corps. In contrast to this, the
Soviet attacks of late January and early February diverged
from each other. From the Upper Don the Soviets advanced
simultaneously toward Kursk, Kharkov, Dnepropetrovsk,
Mariupol, and Rostov. As one group drew closer to its
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objective it lost the support of neighboring formations which
were moving away from it toward their own objectives. An
important part of Manstein's success was his convergence of
effort throughout the counterattack.
By skillfully combining these three Principles of War
during the heat of battle, Manstein was able to develop
tremendous momentum in his attack. Working under great stress
and hampered by numerous constraints, he not only maintained
his composure, but reversed the strategic situation on the
East front in only one month. Manstein ranks as a military
genius. Any officer in the U.S. Armed Forces would do well to
study his exploits during the Winter of 1942-43.
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VIII. SQMAR7 AMD OCNCUOSIGNS
The qualities a compander must have to achieve victory in
war have changed little over the centuries. Clausewitz
identified them clearly in the 1800s. Manstein embodied all
of them in a harmonious combination, during the Winter of
1942-43. For that reason he can be considered a military
genius. The recent conflict in the Persian Gulf has proven
again the importance of human qualities on the battlefield.
The qualities Clausewitz attributed to military genius are
still valid because of the unchanging "climate of war".
Danger, Exertion, Uncertainty, and Chance continue to affect
the course of battles.
In operation '*Desert Storm", both sides had many high-
technology weapons. A trend towards high-technology weapons
appears likely to continue through the 1990s. The issue in
the Persian Gulf was not decided, however, by "smart-bombs",
"Scud" missiles, "Patriot" missiles, or any particular weapon,
as the media might have us believe. Success in "Desert Storm"
was decided by the qualities of the humans who wielded the
weapons and commanded the troops. High-technology systems did
little to diminish the "climate of war" for the commanders on
either side.
The analysis in this thesis examined the success of
Manstein during the Winter of 1942-43 on the East Front.
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While it provides an accurate account of the fighting, its
focus is on Manstein. What decisions did he make, when, and
why? The major source for these insights were his memoirs
written shortly after the war. These were supported by
several secondary sources. These references cannot tell
exactly what Manstern thought at the moments of decision. But
they do provide certain windows into the mind of the genius.
The section in this thesis on the fate of Sixth Army
showed the strategic thinking of Manstein under stress. From
his first days as commander Army Group Don he methodically set
priorities for the achievement of his goals. While there was
any chance of relieving Sixth Army, he committed every member
of his command to achieve that goal . During the attempt
,
Manstein consciously placed his units at considerable risk.
Failure to free Sixth Army could not be attributed to any one
thing Manstein did or did not do. In the end, the issue was
decided by personalities over which he had no control. Also
in the first days of his command, Manstein laid the foundation
for his counterattack. With a special insight he accurately
saw the possibilities open to himself and his enemy* It was
extraordinary that his appraisals of late November, 1942,
proved correct after three months of heavy fighting.
In the next section of the thesis, the expanded Soviet
threat is described. Manstein was stretched to the limit by
Soviet pressure and his obligation to guard Rostov for armies
deep in the Caucasus. Hitler's leadership was especially
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frustrating to him, as he was denied freedom of action.
German tactical superiority over the Soviets continued to
sustain Manstein on the battlefield. Even while his situation
seemed to worsen, the Soviets were moving in the directions
Manstein had predicted. He trusted his long term view and
continued to make decisions accordingly.
In the third section of the thesis, Army Group Don reached
maximum danger. The Soviets were within miles of cutting off
the entire southern wing of the East Front. Hitler was
prepared twice to tie Manstein' s hands strategically by
scuttling his planned counterattack. By skillful maneuvering,
politically and militarily, Manstein was able to avoid
disaster. His earlier predictions had proven true and his
strike groups were in position by mid-February to deliver his
counterattack.
The final section shows the culmination of Manstein'
s
efforts over the preceding three months. As the Soviets
stretched to grasp victory, Manstein delivered a crushing blow
with five Panzer Corps. He targeted the enemy force rather
than taking territory. Before his counterattack ended, the
Soviets had lost, Kharkov, nearly five Armies, and the
strategic initiative for the coming Spring. Manstein 's
achievement ranks with the most extraordinary of military
history.
The final section discussed some discernable patterns in
Manstein' s method of war. He focused his energies on the one
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element of the "climate of war" that was most important
uncertainty. He made decisions based on the best available
information. Once Manstein made a decision, he trusted it to
remain valid even as the situation governing it seemed to
change. He instinctively understood the elements that decided
an issue and considered adjusting only when one of those
specific elements had changed. By bringing uncertainty under
control he reduced the severity of the "climate of war".
Manstein was assisted throughout the campaign by the
legacy of the German General Staff. The axioms established by
the General Staff helped to bring out the genius of Manstein.
By rigorously institutionalizing excellence the General Staff
produced an army in which each member could be trusted to use
personal initiative in the absence of direct guidance,
regardless of his rank.
The leadership style of Manstein focused to the maximum
extent possible on the development of a rapport with his
subordinates. He maintained a professional distance from them
but set examples they might respect at every opportunity.
From his past military victories to his disciplinary actions
against the mistreatment of Soviet prisoners of war, his
troops could see in him a commander worthy of respect.
Manstein preferred face to face interaction whenever possible.
Manstein also understood the importance in battle of
Initiative, Surprise, and Concentration of Effort. Most
students of war study these principles in the calm safety of
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classrooms with no real linkage to the "climate of war".
Manstein used than effectively in the chaos of battle. He
held a firm grasp an these principles and knew the advantages
they offered and how to exploit them under any circumstances.
The Soviets themselves enabled Manstein to be so
successful. Their unusually ambitious objectives "that
Winter" placed their necks firmly into Manstein's trap. Their
rigid system of central control blinded them to developing
trends on the battlefield and slowed their response once the
trend was discerned. If STAVKA had remained operationally
conservative, as was the case through most of the war, their
gains may have been less but they might have avoided
Manstein's counterattack and retained the strategic initiative
on the East Front into the Spring.
As the U.S. Armed Forces are asked to do more with less in
the 1990s, they will need the best possible personnel. Their
commanders will need to be at home an the battlefield and
capable of doing things right the first time. The American
public will not tolerate, nor can it afford anything less from
its armed forces. The command style of Manstein during the
Winter of 1942-43 provides valuable insight into what makes
war on paper different from real war. Manstein's techniques
in the Winter of 1942-43 on the East Front provide a framework
for preparing for war as it really is.
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